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Abstract (EN)
Nowadays more and more companies use agile software development to build software
in short release cycles. Monolithic applications are split into microservices, which can
independently be maintained and deployed by agile teams. Modern platforms like Docker
support this process. Docker offers services to containerize such services and orchestrate
them in a container cluster. A software supply chain is the umbrella term for the process
of developing, automated building and testing, as well as deploying a complete applica-
tion. By combining a software supply chain and Docker, those processes can be automated
in standardized environments. Since Docker is a young technology and software supply
chains are critical processes in organizations, security needs to be reviewed. In this work
a software supply chain based on Docker is built and a threat modeling process is used
to assess its security. The main components are modeled and threats are identified using
STRIDE. Afterwards risks are calculated and methods to secure the software supply chain
based on security objectives confidentiality, integrity and availability are discussed. As
a result, some components require special treatments in security context since they have
a high residual risk of being targeted by an attacker. This work can be used as basis to
build and secure the main components of a software supply chain. However additional
components such as logging, monitoring as well as integration into existing business pro-
cesses need to be reviewed.
Abstract (DE)
Heutzutage nutzen mehr und mehr Firmen agile Softwareentwicklung, um Software in
kurzen Release-Zyklen zu entwickeln. Monotlithische Anwendungen werden in Microser-
vices aufgeteilt, welche unabha¨ngig voneinander erstellt und vero¨ffentlicht werden ko¨nnen.
Moderne Plattformen wie Docker unterstu¨tzen diesen Prozess. Docker bietet Dienste an,
um solche Anwendungen in Container zu verpacken und sie auf Container Clustern zu
orchestrieren. Eine Software Supply Chain ist der U¨berbegriff fu¨r den Prozess der Herstel-
lung, des automatisierten Bauens und Testens, sowie der Vero¨ffentlichung von Software.
Durch die Kombination aus Software Supply Chains und Docker ko¨nnen diese Prozesse
in standardisierten Umgebungen automatisiert werden. Da Docker eine junge Technolo-
gie ist und Software Supply Chains einen kritischen Prozess im Unternehmen darstellen,
muss zuna¨chst die Sicherheit u¨berpru¨ft werden. In dieser Arbeit wird Bedrohungsmodel-
lierung verwendet, um eine Software Supply Chain auf Basis von Docker zu bauen und
abzusichern. Die Hauptkomponenten werden modelliert und Bedrohungen mit Hilfe von
STRIDE identifiziert. Daraufhin werden Risiken berechnet und Mo¨glichkeiten diskutiert,
die Software Supply Chain auf Basis der Sicherheitsziele Vertraulichkeit, Integrita¨t und
Verfu¨gbarkeit abzusichern. Als Resultat dieser Arbeit stellte sich heraus, dass einige Kom-
ponenten eine spezielle Behandlung im Sicherheitskontext beno¨tigen, da sie u¨ber ein hohes
Restrisiko verfu¨gen, Ziel eines Angriffes zu werden. Diese Arbeit kann als Basis fu¨r den
Bau und die Absicherung einer Software Supply Chain genutzt werden. Jedoch mu¨ssen
zusa¨tzliche Komponenten, wie beispielsweise ein Monitoring- und Logging-Prozess, oder
die Integration in bestehende Business-Prozesse u¨berpru¨ft werden.
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1 Introduction
Agile software development has been in mainstream for a few years now [120]. Accord-
ing to the survey The 10th annual State of Agile Report [116] 62% of the participating
companies use this approach to speed up their product delivery chain and increase team
productivity. To establish agile processes in the enterprise, containerization is often used
[42]. Containerization offers isolation of an application into its own environment based
on container technology like LinuX Containers (LXC), as an alternative to hypervisor
virtualization [114]. These containers are light weight and easier to rollout due to encap-
sulation of their dependencies compared to classical virtual machines [114]. Additionally,
applications running on the same host can be isolated from each other and from the
host, as well as their permissions can be reduced to a minimum, which brings a benefit
in security terms [42]. According to the survey Container Market Adoption Survey 2016
[12] with 310 participating companies, Docker is the leading container technology. The
survey shows that 94% of the companies use Docker as container technology, especially
to increase efficiency of the development process and to support microservices. For these
reasons the Docker ecosystem is used as basis for this work. According to an evaluation
from Datadog [20], approximately 10,7% of their clients already adopted Docker in their
company, which means that container technology is still in its beginnings and companies
just started to deal with this topic. The growth rate of the adoption from May 2015 to
May 2016 lies around 30%, which shows the importance of the technology. But at this
point security issues could arise, since new processes aren’t always build with security in
mind. Six of the most used Docker images [20] have been scanned by Docker Security
Scanner [111], whereat all of them had at least one or more critical vulnerabilities in the
latest tag [63, 60, 62, 58, 59, 61]. From a companies’ view, a survey from 2011 shows that
59% of participating companies are aware of targeted attacks [109]. Docker itself offers
an approach for a software supply chain with its enterprise solution with some security
features included [110], which have been continuously evolving over the last months and
years. Some examples are an identity and access management, consistent builds and tests,
automated security scanning, as well as signed images.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Due to the rising interests of companies, the growth rate and the young presence of Docker
on the market, this topic offers possibilities to do research. Companies are just beginning
to use the technology, therefore not many matured and secured processes (particularly in
the area of software supply chains) have been established. Also companies are getting hit
by cyber attacks [5] and suffer from data breaches [10], for example Yahoo [92].
Software supply chains are collections of processes and components to continuously
test, build and deliver software releases to customers. They are critical processes in the
company, since source code and sensitive information are transferred from one component
to another. New security concepts and processes are required to protect supply chains
from attacks and to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of data [77]. In the last
months Docker released some new features like secrets management [87] and announced
the split in Docker Enterprise and Community Edition [30]. In the past researchers
successfully demonstrated attacks on Docker, as for example an attack on host systems
by using devices, which have not been namespaced [117]. Papers like To Docker or not
to Docker [16] show the need of additional research and security concepts by pointing
out existing security issues. Another challenge is the integration of new concepts (like for
example containerization or microservices) into existing company infrastructures.
1.2 Contribution
Readers of this work will gain knowledge in the field of agile software development, con-
tainer virtualization, the Docker ecosystem and information security. This work will
illustrate possible attacks like for example Denial of Service (DoS), code injection or ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities on a software supply chain and discuss security mitigations. The
reader will be able to use this work as a guideline on how to reduce the overall risk of an
attack on the main components. The problems which will be addressed are as follows:
• Unawareness of companies of possible risks and attacks, as well as consequences of
an attack on software supply chains
• Insecurity of critical software supply chains based on Docker
• Complexity of software supply chains
• Lack of guidelines and best practices in secure software supply chains based on
Docker
The research questions for this work are as follows:
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1.3 Requirements
• How to design and build a secure software supply chain based on Docker?
• How to secure each step and component of the software supply chain to guarantee
confidentially, integrity and availability?
• How to secure communication between components?
• Can a Software Supply Chain be completely secure?
1.3 Requirements
The main goals of this work are to build and secure a software supply chain based on
Docker. Each requirement has a unique number and will be discussed in the final Chapter
Conclusion.
#1 Understand the Background and the Docker Ecosystem
The first requirement is to gain basic knowledge which is required to achieve the main
goals. This is for example the concept of container virtualization and its use in agile
software development, microservices and continuous integration (CI) pipelines as well as
the Docker environment. To analyze possible threats and risks, knowledge about infor-
mation security, security objectives, security principles and attacks on computer systems
is required. Also a structured scientific process is required to identify threats, calculate
risks and discuss mitigation strategies.
#2 Build a Software Supply Chain
After explaining background information, a typical software supply chain has to be de-
scribed. The descriptions should be limited to the main components and processes.
#3 Secure the Software Supply Chain
After explaining the software supply chain, a threat modeling process has to be applied to
find threats. The threat model should be based on the main security objectives confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability [77]. After the main components and threats have been
identified, they need to be assessed and possible countermeasures described to reduce the
overall attack surface to a minimum.
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#4 Use Docker as base Technology
Since Docker is the leading container technology on the market, it is used as base technol-
ogy for this work [12]. It should be used to containerize and run components of a software
supply chain, as well as the application which is developed.
#5 Use Open Source / Free software
To allow a cost efficient and open software supply chain which can be used by everybody,
only open source or free software should be used. This excludes software like Docker
Enterprise or other commercial pre-built solutions from the scope of this work. However,
proposed concepts are designed to be adaptable to other products as well.
1.4 Related Work
Docker Scan, Claire and Docker Bench for Security
Docker Scan [19], Claire [17] and Docker Bench for Security [40] are security analysis
tools for the Docker ecosystem. Docker Scan and Claire provide analysis for Docker
images and the Docker Registry. Claire focuses on static analysis of Docker images, while
Docker Scan also allows to scan registries. Docker Bench for Security checks for common
best-practices around containers in production. These tools help to analyze sub-aspects
of this work, but not the complete software supply chain.
To Docker or not to Docker
The paper To Docker or not to Docker [16] analyzes parts of the Docker ecosystem, as for
example the Docker Daemon, Docker Hub or networking in terms of security and shows
some vulnerabilities which still need to be addressed. This paper provides a good basis
for additional research as it shows some basic weaknesses. This work will inspect all
components and processes of a software supply chain, including the subset of this paper.
Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers
The whitepaper Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers [33] discusses basic con-
tainer technologies, evaluates them and discusses security features. This whitepaper pro-
vides good basic knowledge about Docker containers and will be used to describe Docker
images in context of security and how to reduce the attack surface.
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1.5 Structure of this Work
CIS Docker 1.13.0 Benchmark
The CIS Docker 1.13.0 Benchmark [22] describes requirements and configurations for a
secure Docker environment. This guidelines can be used to harden hosts in a Docker
environment.
Securing Jenkins CI Systems
The article Securing Jenkins CI Systems [82] describes how to reduce the attack surface
of a Jenkins build server. It describes general approaches like enabling Jenkins security,
SSL encryption or disabling the CLI. This article can be used to apply basic hardening
to the build server used in this work.
Security Assurance of Docker Containers
The article Security Assurance of Docker Containers [84] reviews security aspects of
Docker containers. It describes Notary, Docker Security Scanning and different secu-
rity scanners. This article helps to get basic knowledge about Docker Content Trust and
Container Scanners, which will be discussed when securing the software supply chain.
1.5 Structure of this Work
In Chapter Agile Software Development and Docker background knowledge to agile soft-
ware development, container virtualization and Docker is explained. In the next Chapter
Methodology the basic threat modeling process which is used to identify threats and cal-
culate risks is described. Afterwards in Chapter Modeling a Software Supply Chain the
software supply chain is described and the main components are identified. The follow-
ing Chapter Threat Analysis first creates a list of components, users, data flows and trust
boundaries. Afterwards, possible threats and attack vectors are elaborated. These threats
are then analyzed, rated and countermeasures discussed in Chapter Securing the Software
Supply Chain. In the last Chapter Conclusion a final conclusion is given and results are
discussed.
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2 Agile Software Development and
Docker
This chapter provides basic knowledge. First, agile software development and microser-
vices are described. It is explained why this approach combined with a continuous inte-
gration (CI) pipeline helps to deliver software of higher quality. Afterwards, differences
between hypervisor and container virtualization and its integration into agile software
development are explained. Finally, an overview of the Docker ecosystem is given.
2.1 Agile Software Development
Agile software development defines values and principles to develop valuable software in
an iterative and quick process, while facing continuously changing requirements [90]. An
agile software development process aids to help teams to respond to unpredictability by
using an iterative workflow with continuous feedback [90]. It uses light-but-sufficient and
human- and communication-oriented rules to stay slim and efficient without increasing
the risk of mistakes [13]. This has proven to be more successful for specific projects than
other approaches, therefore more and more companies are starting to use it [116]. In
2001, the Agile Alliance developed a statement of values which are used to work quickly
and respond to change. This statement is called The Manifesto of the Agile Alliance. It
describes four rules (quoted from Agile software development: principles, patterns, and
practices [90]):
• “Individuals and interactions over processes and tools”
• “Working software over comprehensive documentation”
• “Customer collaboration over contract negotiation”
• “Responding to change over following a plan”
The meaning of the four rules are explained in the following paragraphs. The descrip-
tions are based on sources: [90, 13].
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Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
This value means that good processes are relevant for the project, but they don’t guar-
antee success. More important than processes and used tools is the team itself. Good
communication and team building increase efficiency and reduce mistakes caused by mis-
understandings.
Working software over comprehensive documentation
Documentation is required all over the project to pass information from one person to
another. Missing documentation can lead to misunderstandings and reduce quality of the
project. On the other hand, if there is too much detailed documentation, efficiency is
decreasing. For this reason, short, concise and meaningful documentation is required.
Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
This value describes the relationship between developers and customers. Contracts are
useful to mark borders, but software cannot be completely defined from the beginning.
Hence regular customer feedback and collaboration needs to be part of the process.
Responding to change over following a plan
Change is an essential part in agile projects. For this reason plans need to be flexible and
able to adapt to each change in technology and business.
Multiple processes and frameworks have been developed which follow the agile approach:
Scrum [106], Crystal [14], Adaptive Software Development [37] or Extreme Programming
(XP) [3].
As the survey Agile Development: Mainstream Adoption Has Changed Agility from
Forrester has found out, Scrum is the most popular agile development process with 10.9%
that is used by organizations [120]. It is a software development framework based on
interoperable teams which work together to reach a common goal [105]. It defines member
roles, such as a product owner, a scrum master and the development team [105]. It also
defines artifacts, like for example the product backlog, the sprint backlog and burn-up /
-down charts to manage the product and measure results of each work package [105]. All
work is done in sprints, which is a planned period of time (for example 14 days) in which
items of the sprint backlog are completed [105].
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2.2 Microservices
Microservices are an approach to cut down monolithic applications into small parts that
work together, called microservices [29]. A monolithic application is one single executable
unit which can grow over time [29]. For every change the whole application has to be
deployed [96]. Microservices instead are small and lightweight applications, which are
independently maintainable and deployable [4]. They often communicate via REST and
can be developed in any programming language [29]. The key benefits of microservices
are listed in Table 2.1.
Benefit Explanation
Technology Heterogeneity A system can consist of services based on
different technologies, each optimized for
its use case and people working on the ser-
vice.
Resilience If one system fails, the failure does not cas-
cade and the problem can be isolated.
Scaling Each service can be scaled independently
to fit the requirements.
Ease of Deployment Services can be deployed independently,
which speeds up the deployment process.
Organizational Alignment Smaller teams are working on smaller
codebases, which is more productive and
can be better aligned to the architecture
of the organization.
Composability Services can be reused for different pur-
poses since interfaces have to be docu-
mented.
Optimizing for Replaceability Replacing a small microservice is easier
and less critical than replacing an old
monolith.
Table 2.1: Key Benefits of Microservices ([96])
Agile software development processes, like for example Scrum define small interdis-
ciplinary teams which are responsible for a single product [105]. If a product consists
of multiple microservices, each service can be managed by a Scrum team. By using
this approach, features can independently be developed and deployed. Additionally, con-
tainerization can be used to package those microservices including all its dependencies
into small and isolated containers, which makes them suitable for big container clusters,
like for example Docker Swarm or Kubernetes [33].
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2.3 Continuous Integration / Deployment
Agile software development processes nowadays use CI to frequently build and test work
done by developers. This integration is described in the book Continuous Delivery: Re-
liable Software Releases through Build, Test, and Deployment Automation [38], which is
used as basis for this chapter. Using CI increases overall software quality and reduces
release cycles. CI stands for the collection of techniques, tools and processes to automati-
cally build and test software on each change. A deployment pipeline is the implementation
of such an automated build, test, deploy and release process. Figure 2.1 shows a typical
deployment pipeline.
Figure 2.1: The Deployment Pipeline ([38, p. 4])
It starts with a Commit state in which developers compile source code, run tests and
analysis tools and build an installer. The following steps (Automated acceptance testing,
Automated capacity testing and Manual testing) are a series of tests to prove that the
software is ready to be released. The final step is to release the software. This process
allows to find errors as quickly as possible because it automatically stops and notifies
developers, if a test fails [28]. Typically a build server is required to automatically build
software on a regular basis. This server runs tests for each component (unit tests) or tests
for the collaboration of different components (integration testing).
CD extends a CI process by automatically deploying each change to the target environ-
ment after tests and build succeeded. This step is possible, if the included unit, component
and acceptance tests are in high quality and cover a big part of the application.
2.4 Software Supply Chain
The term supply chain management (SCM) is defined as the concatenation of systems
and processes to fulfill an order [119]. SCM ranges from the Source of Supply to the
Point of Consumption [119]. The goal of SCM is the supply, removal and recycling of
organizational activities [119]. Different components have to be analyzed, like for example
quantities, qualities, prices, delivery and storage locations as well as delivery dates [119].
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Derived from traditional SCM, a software supply chain (SSC) is a combination of processes
and required resources to deliver software. The derived components are software quality,
licenses, infrastructure and release dates. The complete process of traditional SCM and
a modern SSC can be matched with each other, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Software Supply Chain ([110])
SCM has to identify raw materials (in SSC: sources and dependencies), assemble them
(in SSC: build systems and engineers), ship the item (in SSC: network), store the item (in
SSC: application repository) and finally sell it (in SSC: deploy) [110]. The build and ship
process can be mapped onto a CI pipeline to automatically build and deliver software
regularly. The main objectives which are addressed when realizing a SSC are listed in
Table 2.2. Those objectives are achieved using the key principles of a supply chain, which
are listed in Table 2.3.
Factor Explanation
Efficiency Doing the right things and Doing the
things right to increase overall efficiency.
Managing Competition Factors Watching the key factors and knowledge
about competition.
Costs Reduce delivery, storing or hosting costs.
Time Optimizing throughput time of the soft-
ware.
Quality Increasing software quality.
Flexibility Reacting to changes.
Table 2.2: Objectives of a SSC ([110])
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Principle Explanation
Compression Reducing the number of steps which are
required to build the software.
Cooperation Usage of partners to achieve the objec-
tives.
Virtualization Combine competences and build virtual
networks to act as a single unit.
Standardization Use standardized modules to optimize ex-
change of parameters within the supply
chain and reduce delivery times.
Client orientation Changes are triggered when client need ex-
ists (pull principle).
Optimization Optimization based on experiences and
calculations.
Table 2.3: Key Principles of a SSC ([110])
2.5 Virtualization
To create a dynamic SSC, microservices in combination with container virtualization is
used, to better use available hardware resources. Virtualization in general is an approach
to divide hardware resources into multiple environments [2]. Gartner says that the market
has matured over the last years and many organizations have virtualization rates bigger
than 75% in their data centers [74]. Cloud providers, like Amazon AWS or Microsoft
Azure use virtualization in their data center which helps them to provide infrastructure
as a service (IaaS) [7]. Virtualization can be found on both, client side and server side. The
server side virtualization can be divided into two classes: hypervisor based virtualization
and container based virtualization [7]. Hypervisor based virtualization depends on a piece
of software called hypervisor, which abstracts hardware resources for virtual machines.
Container based virtualization defines so called containers, which can be used to isolate
applications from each other on the same OS kernel [7].
2.5.1 Hypervisor Virtualization
Hypervisor based virtualization allows complete virtual machines (VMs) to run on a
hypervisor. Those VMs consist of a complete OS, including a kernel, dependencies and
applications [7]. The hypervisor itself is a piece of software which either runs directly on
hardware or in an operating system [7]. Two classes of hypervisors exist: Type 1 and
Type 2 (Figure 2.3).
Type 1 hypervisors (also known as bare metal hypervisors) run directly on hardware. An
example for a Type 1 hypervisor would be VMWare ESXi or Xen Hypervisor [33, 7]. Type
2 hypervisors (also known as hosted hypervisors) run on top of a host operating system.
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Figure 2.3: Hypervisor based Virtualization
Examples for a Type 2 hypervisor would be VirtualBox, VMWare Workstation or QEMU
[75, 93]. The isolation degree is quite robust, since special CPU instructions provide
hardware isolation and the hypervisor itself offers a small attack surface [33]. Nevertheless
researches have shown successful attacks (for example VENOM [95] on QEMU), although
they are rare [33].
2.5.2 Container Virtualization
Container virtualization (also called containerization) uses kernel functionality to isolate
groups of processes from each other [33]. This provides the basis for technologies like for
example Docker or Rkt. The isolated environments are called containers. They are created
using a combination of multiple kernel features, such as kernel namespaces, cgroups or
root capabilities. They share the same OS kernel, so no hypervisor is required [7, 93].
Figure 2.4 shows multiple application containers (boxes with double lines) which run on
the same host OS.
Compared to hypervisor virtualization, footprints of applications are smaller, since no
additional OS and kernel is required in-between [33]. Container virtualization offers higher
performance and faster start up times since the applications run directly on the kernel.
This is why it is preferred over hypervisor virtualization when performance is needed
[75, 33].
Container technologies as LXC, Docker or Rkt offer platforms and definitions for con-
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Figure 2.4: Container Virtualization
tainers and images. Those approaches gained popularity in the last years, since the
ongoing shift from traditional three tier datacenters to large computers running multi-
ple virtual machine instances [33]. Container technologies abstract many details of how
containers are created and managed away from developers [8].
Mechanisms for Container Virtualization
Containers are mainly created by using the following kernel features: Kernel namespaces
and Control Groups (cgroups) [33]. These features focus on creating process groups which
are isolated from each other (kernel namespaces) and imposing resource limits (control
groups) [33].
Kernel Namespaces
Kernel namespaces provide isolation feature of container technology. They isolate multiple
processes by logically dividing their kernel space into multiple environments (for example
network, processes or file system) [7]. This causes processes to not be able to see or
manipulate other processes running on the same host [53]. Isolation is achieved by splitting
the global resource identifier table of the kernel and other structures like for example
networks into multiple instances (one per process). This creates a per-process view of
the kernel [33]. However, not all kernel functionalities as for instance devices, time,
syslog or proc and sys pseudo file systems support namespaces [33]. The main namespace
features are mount namespaces, inter-process communication (IPC) namespaces, UNIX
Timesharing System (UTS) namespaces, process identifier (PID) namespaces, network
namespaces and user namespaces [33]. Mount namespaces provide a specific view to the
file system. IPC namespaces allows the creation of objects which are visible to members of
the same group, but not to others. This is often used to share memory between processes
[7]. UTS namespaces allow to set a custom domain or hostname for each member, which is
useful for example for hosting a web application or logging [7]. PID namespaces are used
to create new processes using a PID starting at 1, which is useful for porting applications
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from one host to the other, while maintaining the PIDs of running processes [7].
Control Groups
Control Groups (or cgroups) are used to limit hardware resources like CPU count and
usage, disk performance or memory to control performance or security [7]. Those restric-
tions can be applied to a single process or a collection of processes. Cgroups can be used
to ensure that a single container cannot exhaust the system by using all of its resources
[53]. The rules are organized in a tree structure and they are inheritable and optionally
nestable. Cgroups can be seen as an enhancement to basic ulimits / rlimits and can be
used as an additional security mechanism besides kernel namespaces [33]. The config-
uration is done via a special virtual file system mounted in /sys/fs/cgroup and can
be changed at any time [33]. The main cgroup subsystems are CPU, memory, BLKIO,
devices, network and freezer. If configured wrong, this can also be a security issue, since
it can be used for a container escape [36]. In context of container technology, most of
cgroups management is abstracted away, with the exception of LXC [33].
Security of Container Virtualization
Compared to hypervisor virtualization, container virtualization offers less isolation since
no hypervisor is in between containers [33]. While in hypervisor virtualization an attacker
would have to break the OS kernel and additionally the hypervisor, the only layer of
security in container virtualization is the OS kernel itself [33]. If an application inside a
container contains an exploitable bug, an attacker can get access to it [33]. From there it
is possible to either attack the kernel with a kernel vulnerability or scan the network for
other containers or hosts who could also be compromisable or contain sensitive data [33].
If a kernel vulnerability exists, all applications sharing the same kernel are affected and
isolation mechanisms could be bypassed. This would be a compromise of all containers
running on the same kernel and the complete host system [33]. To improve isolation
capabilities and prevent container to host escapes, the following kernel features are used:
Linux capabilities, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Seccomp [33].
Linux Capabilities
Linux Capabilities are attributes which limit privileges of processes run by the root user
[7]. They help to enforce namespaces by restricting powers of the root user in containers
[7]. This is for example problematic if the setuid bit is used in combination with root owner
to execute a binary with root privileges [33]. If the binary contains a memory vulnerability,
root access can be obtained by everyone who has access to the binary [33]. By limiting
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capabilities of the binary to for example only access to a raw socket (CAP NET RAW),
damage which can be done by abusing the vulnerability is reduced, since the attacker now
has limited access to raw sockets [33]. Linux Capabilities are stored using the extended
attributes (xattr) in the security namespace of the binary. Additionally, when starting
the binary, a capability bitmap is created for the process and then enforced by the kernel
[33]. Some examples for capabilities which were randomly picked for this work are listed
in Table 2.4.
Capability Explanation
CAP SETCAP Change UIDs / GIDs of files.
CAP KILL Send the kill signal to a process.
CAP SYS CHROOT Use chroot to change root directory.
CAP SYS MODULE Load and unload kernel modules.
CAP SYS RAWIO Perform I/O port operations, for example
on /dev/mem.
Table 2.4: Linux Capabilities ([33])
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is an optional security feature for containers [33]. It
controls access to objects (files, sockets or directories) by using subjects (processes or
users) based on security contexts [34]. The default rule is denying each object access,
unless not explicitly allowed. This feature is fully integrated into the kernel, so it is
possible to reach and control every access made [33]. Due to the complex rules, it can be
hard to configure [33]. The most common frameworks are AppArmor or SELinux [7].
Syscall Filtering with Seccomp
Seccomp is a kernel feature which allows the transition of a process into a secure com-
puting mode [33]. In this mode the process is only able to make the following system
calls: exit(), sigreturn(), read() and write() [33]. This mode is also called SEC-
COMP MODE STRICT [33]. If the process attempts to make another system call,
the kernel will terminate the process with a SIGKILL [33]. Another mode is SEC-
COMP MODE FILTER, which allows to filter system calls for a process using Berkeley
Packet Filter (BPF) rules. This mode requires the kernel extension seccomp-bpf [33].
BPF is a pseudo-language which was designed to allow performant in-kernel bytecode
evaluation in a safe and simple language [33].
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2.6 Docker Ecosystem
After describing the core concepts of container virtualization, Docker which is based on
those concepts is described in this chapter. It adds an abstraction layer on top of the earlier
described container virtualization mechanisms. Docker is a platform to develop, ship and
distribute applications [51]. It allows to package applications into containers, which can
be run isolated from each other on the same host without the need of a hypervisor [7, 42].
It provides tooling and the platform to manage the lifecycle of containers [51]. Docker also
allows to combine multiple hosts into one single cluster and distribute applications onto
this cluster [71]. Docker can be used to create standardized environments for applications
and integrate those into a CI workflow, to automatically test, deploy and scale them
[71]. This helps developers to develop applications in the same environment as used in
production [51]. In this work, Docker is used to containerize an exemplary application
which is then built and shipped using a SSC. It is also used to run and scale the application
in a Docker swarm, as well as for running components of a SSC. The central part of Docker
is Docker Engine, as explained in Chapter Docker Engine in more detail. The latest release
of Docker is used in this work (17.06). An overview of the main services offered by Docker
is shown in the following list [51]:
• Docker Engine (core of the Docker ecosystem)
• Docker Compose (definition of one or multiple services in a single file)
• Docker Swarm (orchestration of containers on highly available clusters)
• Docker Registry (storage of Docker images)
• Universal Control Plane (management of containers and container clusters in busi-
ness environments)
• Docker Secrets (management of secrets in a swarm)
• Docker Content Trust (store and validate signed Docker tags)
2.6.1 Docker Engine
The Docker Engine is the core of the Docker ecosystem. It is a client server application
which has three major components, as shown in Figure 2.5: the Docker Daemon which
runs on the host, a REST API provided by the Docker Daemon and a command line
interface (CLI) (the docker command) [51]. The REST API takes commands from the
CLI and processes them further [51]. The API can be exposed either via local socket
on the same host or a network exposed port [51]. The CLI offers commands to manage
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networks, containers and images or volumes for containers [51]. The Docker Engine needs
to be installed on each system, which interacts with Docker.
Figure 2.5: Docker Overview ([51])
Docker Daemon
The Docker Daemon runs on the host (as root) and is responsible for listening and pro-
cessing API requests from the Docker Client [53]. It also manages Docker Objects as for
instance images, containers, networks and volumes. To build images it parses a so called
Dockerfile and executes the instructions [33]. Trusted users should be allowed to control
the Docker Daemon, since if someone controls the dockerd process, he is able to spawn
a privileged container, which is able to mount the root filesystem of the host as writable
[33].
Docker Client
The Docker Client (or the docker command) is used to communicate with the Docker
Daemon. The Docker Client is the primary way to run a command in the Docker world
[51]. If a docker command is run, the client sends it to the Docker Daemon, which directs
all further actions [51].
2.6.2 Docker Images
Docker Images are read-only templates (blueprints) for running a container [51]. They
contain the root file system for the container plus some additional parameters and a config-
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uration file [51]. To build an image, a Dockerfile with instructions is used in combination
with the docker build command [51]. This will result in a multi-layered read-only file
system representing the Dockerfile. Each instruction in the Dockerfile will create another
layer on top of the layered file system [51]. To speed up the build process, each layer
is cached [51]. If another docker build command is executed, only those layers which
have changed are rebuilt [51]. An image is identified by an image record identifier, like
for example mydomain.de:5000/my-image:v1 [45].
2.6.3 Containers
Containers are a runnable instance of an image with a lifecycle, which is shown in Fig-
ure 2.6 [51].
Figure 2.6: Docker Container Events and States ([104])
The most main states of a Docker container are created, running, paused, stopped and
deleted [104]. The Docker CLI offers commands to control the creation, execution, stop-
ping or deletion of containers [51]. To access network or data, it is possible to attach
networks or volumes to the container [51].
2.6.4 File Formats
Dockerfile
The Dockerfile is a plaintext file which contains directives on how to build a Docker image,
each in a new line [55]. Each instruction (with some exceptions) creates a new layer on
the layered file system of the image [55]. The Docker Engine is responsible for parsing and
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interpreting those instructions, then building the final Docker image from it [55]. Those
directives can for example define the base operating system (FROM), run a command in the
image (RUN), expose a port to the network (EXPOSE), add a volume (VOLUME) or define the
initial command to be executed when the image is started (CMD) [33, 55]. Listing 2.1 shows
a sample Dockerfile for a Python application, which is based on the official python image
([68]) with the tag 3.4-alpine. It first copies the current working directory into a path
called /code in the image and defines this folder as the working directory. Afterwards it
runs pip install -r requirements.txt in the image to install dependencies, assuming
the file requirements.txt exists in the /code folder. Afterwards, the command which is
executed when the container is started is defined. The Dockerfile is used in this work
to build each component that is based on Docker.
Listing 2.1: Sample Dockerfile
FROM python :3.4- alpine
ADD . /code
WORKDIR /code
RUN pip install -r requirements.txt
CMD [" python", "app.py"]
Compose file
The Compose file defines an application which is made of one or multiple services [44].
A service is for example a database (communicating on port 3306 and backed by a NFS
volume), a frontend (listening on port 80 and 443 and communicating with the backend
service) or a backend service. The Compose file describes parameters, such as listen-
ing ports, the Docker image, build context or resource limits, which are passed to the
containers when they run in a Docker environment [44]. It also defines the networking
environment, as well as which service is placed into which network and whether they are
able to communicate with each other [44, 49]. To share data between containers, it is
possible to define data volumes. Local volumes can only be used in non-swarm mode,
whereas in swarm mode shared volume drivers can be used, like for example NFS, SMB
or iSCSI [44]. Beginning with version 3 of the Compose file reference, deployment pa-
rameters can also be defined, as for instance rolling update policies, replication counters
or placement constraints [44]. Listing 2.2 shows a basic Compose file which defines two
services: redis and web. The redis service is just a reference to the redis:alpine image
from Docker Hub, whereas the web service is built from the Dockerfile in the current
directory. Additionally, the web service has a volume and an exposed port 5000, which is
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mapped to port 5000 on the current host. In this work, the Compose file is used to define
services which are required for the components of a SSC.
Listing 2.2: Sample Compose file
version: "2"
services:
web:
build: .
ports:
- "5000:5000"
volumes:
- .:/ code
redis:
image: "redis:alpine"
2.6.5 Docker Compose
Docker Compose is a CLI application written in Python, that parses a Compose file
and builds a multi-container environment from it [67]. Docker Compose parses a given
Compose file, translates the service, networking and volume definitions into docker run,
docker volume create and docker network create commands and executes them [67].
2.6.6 Docker Registry
An image registry is a central repository for container images [43]. The Docker Registry
is an image registry maintained by Docker Inc [51]. Typically images are built locally or
by a special build server and afterwards pushed into a registry [43]. From here images
can be pulled and run in a container cluster like Docker Swarm [43]. Docker Hub [41]
and Quay.io [18] are two examples of cloud-hosted public registries. If no other registry
is specified in the Docker Engine, Docker Hub is used as default [43].
2.6.7 Docker Swarm
Docker Swarm is the functionality to manage and orchestrate services over multiple nodes
which are running the Docker Daemon [71]. It allows distributing workloads across mul-
tiple nodes which act together as a single unit [51]. As shown in Figure 2.7, a Docker
Swarm consists of multiple manager nodes which share a common state using the Raft
Consensus Algorithm [97] and worker nodes which can receive tasks [56].
The swarm and its services can be controlled using the Docker Engine CLI and API
[71]. Those features are encapsulated in a package called SwarmKit and shipped with the
latest version of the Docker Engine (Version ≥ 1.12) [48]. In this work Docker Swarm is
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Figure 2.7: Docker Swarm Overview ([56])
used to run components of a SSC. These are for example the development environment
including the version control system, the build environment containing the build server
and the testing and production clusters, which are used to provide the application to
testers and end users.
Services
Services define how to run an existing Docker image, the command and parameters
(such as port, resource limit or volumes) and the desired state in the cluster [57]. A
manager node accepts a service definition by an API call and splits this service into tasks,
who are scheduled on available worker nodes [57].
Figure 2.8 shows how one replicated nginx service is split into multiple tasks, each
running on a different node [57]. The scheduler of the manager is responsible for scheduling
tasks onto nodes with available resources [57]. Services marked as global are running on
each node available [57]. To an end user it looks like he is communicating with a single
node of the application.
Nodes
Nodes which are participating in the cluster are running the Docker Daemon in swarm
mode [71]. Nodes can be distributed across multiple physical hosts and cloud machines
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Figure 2.8: Services, Tasks and Containers ([57])
[71].
Manager nodes are responsible for maintaining the status of the cluster, scheduling
services and providing the API which is used to control the cluster [56]. Every manager
node has access to the state of the cluster by the shared Raft log [56]. By default, manager
nodes are also able to execute workloads, this can be disabled in the configuration [56].
Worker nodes receive and execute tasks from the manager nodes [71]. They are running
an agent which receives commands from the manager node and reports back the current
state of the tasks they execute [56].
Overlay Networks
Overlay networks are used to enable communication between containers in Docker Swarms
and to route incoming traffic to the correct container which can be distributed over mul-
tiple nodes [49]. Docker Swarm managers are responsible for sharing the same overlay
network among all required nodes [49]. Only swarm services are able to connect to over-
lay networks, no standalone containers [49]. If the user wants to use overlay networks in
non-swarm mode, an external key-value storage like etcd is required [49]. When swarm
mode is enabled, Docker automatically creates a default overlay network (called Ingress)
to route incoming traffic to the corresponding container which has published a specific
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port [49].
2.6.8 Docker Secrets
Some services need additional credentials, for example a database username and password
[66]. Credentials are blobs of data (for example passwords or SSL certificates) which need
to be securely provided to the containers [66]. Those secrets should not be transmitted
or stored unencrypted in a Dockerfile or the application source code [66].
Docker Secrets is a solution of Docker for secret management which is built into
SwarmKit [66]. It was introduced in Docker version 1.13 [66]. Secrets are centrally
managed in the encrypted swarm’s Raft log, which is replicated across all manager nodes
[66]. By running the CLI command docker secret create, the secret is sent to a swarm
manager over a mutual TLS connection [66]. A secret can be up to 500kb large and can
only be used by swarm services, not by single run containers [66]. If a service has been
granted access to a secret (for example by using the --secret parameter when running a
service), a manager pushes it securely to the corresponding Docker Daemon, which then
mounts it in an in-memory file system into the container [66]. The container is then able
to access the secret in the path /run/secrets/<my secret> [66]. It is possible to grant
and revoke secrets to a service at runtime, but all containers of a service are restarted
[66]. To change a secret while the service is running, it needs to be rotated [66]. When
a container stops, the decrypted secret is automatically unmounted and flushed from the
nodes memory [66]. Docker Secrets can also be used to store non-sensitive data, as for
instance configuration files [66].
2.6.9 Docker Content Trust
This chapter is based on the Docker documentation [45, 65] and the article Security
Assurance of Docker Containers [84].
Docker Content Trust (DCT) is a mechanism to sign and verify image tag. When
pushing an image into a registry, the image can be signed. After pulling an image out of a
registry, this signature can be verified. Notary is the client and server utility behind DCT.
It is used to verify content which can be distributed over an insecure network. It is based
on The Update Framework (TUF). Figure 2.9 shows repositories bound to a single person
or to an organization. A repository can have multiple tags, both signed and unsigned. A
signature of an image is always assigned to a tag.
To force verification of each pulled image on client side, the environment variable
DOCKER CONTENT TRUST=1 can be set. This is disabled by default. If DCT on client
side is enabled, unsigned images of a repository are ignored.
Figure 2.10 shows different keys used to sign image tags. Each repository has a set of
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Figure 2.9: Docker Content Trust ([45])
keys which are used by developers to sign their tags. The keys are created in an interactive
process when an operation using DCT (docker push, docker build, docker create,
docker pull or docker run) is executed for the first time. The following different keys
exist:
Oﬄine / Root Keys
Oﬄine keys are the root keys for creating content trust. They are bound to a specific
person or an organization and used to create tagging keys for repositories. They should
be stored at a safe place and backed up securely.
Targets Key
The targets key, which resides on client side, is bound to a specific repository and is
used by a developer to sign and push image tags.
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Figure 2.10: Signing Keys ([45])
Snapshot Keys
Those keys allow signing the current collection of image tags to prevent mix and match
attacks.
Timestamp Keys
Timestamp Keys are bound to a specific repository and reside on the server. They are
generated by Docker and used to guarantee freshness.
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Delegation Keys
Those keys are optional and allow to delegate signing to other publishers without shar-
ing the targets key.
2.7 Immutable Infrastructure
The immutable infrastructure paradigm provides stable, efficient and version controlled
infrastructure [108]. The main statement of this approach is that once a component (a
host or a container) has been started, it should not be manually changed [108]. If some
configuration has to be altered, the running instance has to be replaced with a new one
[108]. This approach requires full automation and versioning of each component [21],
which can be achieved by using technologies as for example ansible [103] or Docker [100].
In this work the immutable infrastructure paradigm helps to avoid manual interaction
with a running container or a node of a container cluster. It aids to continuously roll out
security patches and reduce the overall risk of vulnerabilities in one of the components.
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3 Methodology
Before this work goes into SSCs, the methodology needs to be defined. It is started by
explaining why and how information needs to be protected and by defining the main
security objectives. Secure design principles and attacks on systems are described to later
use them in the threat modeling process. Afterwards the threat modeling process which
will be used to build and secure a SSC is explained.
3.1 Information Security
Before talking about threat modeling, an overview about information security in general
and security objectives is required. This section provides background knowledge to in-
formation security. A definition of information and security objectives is given, the main
security principles are described and an overview over the main attacks is shown.
3.1.1 Definitions
Asset
An asset is something of value for an organization [78]. Many types of assets exist, such
as machines, facilities, software, services, people, reputation or knowledge [78].
Information
Information is an essential asset in an organization’s business which needs to be protected
in an appropriate way. They can be stored in many forms, for example in digital or
material form [81]. The information to protect in this work is the source code of the
application.
Information Security
Information security is the implementation and management of security measures with the
aim of ensuring business success and continuity and minimizing impacts of information
security incidents [81]. It includes three main objectives: confidentiality, integrity and
availability [81]. Those objectives are also referred as CIA in this work.
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Trust Boundary
A trust boundary is the place where multiple entities interact [107]. Threats often involve
actions across trust boundaries [107]. A trust boundary is for instance a network firewall,
which filters incoming and outgoing traffic [107].
Attack
Attacks in general are maliciously intended actions against one or multiple components
[31]. They are attempts to steal, destroy, manipulate or expose an asset [81]. An at-
tack consists of motivations like stealing money and one or many subgoals [31]. Multiple
activities can be engaged which result in events, like for example unauthorized access
to a system or halting of an application [31]. As a result, consequences like for exam-
ple unavailability of a computer system occur and different impacts on business can be
measured. A direct impact would be loss of revenue due to the inability to process a
business transaction, an indirect impact would be negative impact on the reputation of
the company [31].
Attack Vector
An attack vector is a way by which an attacker could be able to gain unauthorized access
to a computer or network to do harm [80].
Attack Surface
The attack surface is the sum of places where trust boundaries can be crossed, either on
purpose or by accident [107]. It describes how exposed a system is [107]. Applications
with more exposed interfaces have a higher attack surface than applications with less
exposed interfaces [107].
Threat
Threats describe possible events which could lead to harm of a system or an organization
[81]. An example for a threat would be an attacker who is able to bypass the authorization
system by abusing a vulnerability in the software.
Risk
A risk in terms of information security is the chance or probability of loss [79]. The
magnitude of risk can be expressed by the combination of the likelihood of the occurrence
of an event and its impact [79]. The risk level calculation is done using the formula shown
in Figure 3.1.
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Listing 3.1: Risk Calculation
Risk = Likelihood x Impact
Residual Risk
The residual risk is the remaining risk after risk treatment [79].
Security Objectives
The three main security objectives are confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confi-
dentiality is the property that information has to be protected from unauthorized access
[77]. This can be achieved by encrypting the information or keeping it at a safe place.
Also authentication and authorization mechanisms can be used to grant access to specific
people. Integrity is the property of being complete and unmodified [77]. It involves
maintaining consistency and trustworthiness over the entire life cycle. Data should be
protected from modifications when transferred from one person to another. This can for
example be achieved by using checksums or appropriate protocols to transfer data. Avail-
ability is the property of information being available to authorized entities on demand
[77]. An example for providing availability would be to replicate data into multiple data
centers or making sure the network has enough bandwidth to serve data on high load.
3.1.2 Security Principles
To protect data and achieve the CIA objectives, multiple design principles exist. They
help developers, architects and solution providers to create secure systems by design and
avoid common mistakes when working on sensitive data. By using design principles and
standards, misunderstandings can be prevented and compliance increased [26]. These
principles are later used to design, build and secure the SSC. The following security
principles are based on Writing secure code and Security by Design Principles [86, 26].
Minimize Attack Surface Area
Adding a new feature or component means adding an additional attack surface for at-
tackers. This increases the overall risk of the system being compromised. The goal in
designing a secure system is minimizing the overall risk by reducing the attack surface.
An example would be adding a search feature to a web application. The search func-
tion could include a SQL injection vulnerability, which could lead to information leakage
(confidentiality) or data modification (integrity). To reduce the likelihood of an attack,
the search functionality could be allowed for authenticated and authorized users only and
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input data validation could be added. To completely eliminate the attack surface area,
the feature could be removed.
Establish Secure Defaults
When the application or system is shipped to the client, the components should be config-
ured as secure by default. This means that all configurations should be set to values which
provide the least attack surface and highest security standards possible. Clients might
then be allowed to change configuration to a lower security level, while knowing they in-
crease the risk. Secure defaults also means disabling features that are not commonly used
and enabling them when needed. This can also have a positive impact on performance of
a component. An example for a secure default would be a password policy, which is by
default set to a complex password requirement. Administrators might be able to simplify
this policy to improve the login experience for end users, with the cost of increasing the
risk of compromised accounts.
Principle of Least Privilege
This principle recommends reducing privileges of each entity to a minimum which is
required to complete their work. These privileges could be for example access to resources,
other components or to specific files on the filesystem. If a vulnerability was discovered
in a component, damage can only be done in this context, not in context of a higher
privileged component. To integrate this principle, additional planning is required. It
needs to be documented, which component or user can access which resources and why.
Another example for this principle would be that an end user is allowed to use a specific
component, but is not allowed to change administrative settings.
Principle of Defense in Depth
The Principle of Defense in Depth recommends to implement a defense mechanism as if
it would be the last instance and no other protection mechanisms are in front. Adding
controls to reduce risks in multiple ways is more effective than a single regulating control
or even completely relying on external defense mechanisms. This reduces the likelihood
of a single point of failure and vulnerabilities are getting more unlikely and harder to
exploit. An example would be an administrative page which is protected by an authen-
tication / authorization mechanism, as well as audit logging. This reduces the likelihood
of an anonymous attacker gaining access to this page, since he would have to bypass all
mechanisms to stay undetected.
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Fail Securely
The Fail Securely design principle recommends that if a component fails, it should not
disclose data which normally would not be disclosed. It should just show an error message
and log the rest into a different channel. If a component fails and prints out too much
information, this could create new attack vectors for an attacker or leak sensitive infor-
mation. In Listing 3.2 an example is shown, which makes the user an admin per default.
If an attacker could force the functions codeWhichMayFail or isUserInRole to fail, the
attacker would be able to bypass the authorization mechanism.
Listing 3.2: Failing Insecurely ([86])
isAdmin = true;
try {
codeWhichMayFail ();
isAdmin = isUserInRole( A d m i n i s t r a t o r );
}
catch (Exception ex) {
log.write(ex.toString ());
}
Don’t Trust Services
Don’t trust services means that all external third party components and partners should
be treated as untrustworthy. They most likely have other security policies and cannot
be controlled. They could be compromised and send malicious input to the component.
In general, every data received from an external system could be an attack. This design
principle is related to Principle of Defense in Depth, since the assumption that every input
is not to be trusted is also a defense mechanism. An example for this principle would be
a third party API which provides some kind of reward points. Every input received from
the API should be checked and sanitized before displaying it to an end user.
Separation of Duties
A mechanism to prevent fraud is the definition of different roles for different actions. For
example the entity who carries out the action should be different from the entity that
approves or monitors the action. This means that an administrator who maintains the
infrastructure and database of the shop system should not be able to buy from the shop,
since he could abuse his privileges to buy items in the shop for free.
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Avoid Security by Obscurity
Securing a system by hiding implementation details or implementing own mechanisms
which are already covered by standards is bad security practice, since they are more likely
to fail. The principle Avoid Security by Obscurity is similar to the Kerckhoffs’s principle
[83], which states that a cryptosystem has to be secure if everything is known about
the system, except the key. Key system’s security should not rely on hiding information
such as source code but instead use principles like Principle of Defense in Depth, fraud
and audit controls or secure password policies. It should be assumed that an attacker
knows everything an administrator knows and has access to all source code and designs.
By using this strategy, additional mechanisms are implemented to secure the component
which reduces the overall risk.
Keep it Simple
By keeping implementations and architectures simple, failures and errors can be reduced.
It is easier to keep an overview of a simple architecture and things are easier to maintain
and control. Complex approaches also increase the attack surface, which increases the
overall risk of an attack.
Fix Security Issues Correctly
When a security issue is identified, it needs to be fixed correctly to prevent further misuse.
If the issue is involved in multiple components, all other related components need to be
tested as well. For example it is assumed that a flaw has been found that one user can
hijack another user session by modifying the session cookie. If the cookie handling code
is also used in other components, all components need to be tested after a fix has been
issued.
3.1.3 Attacks
This section explains the main attacks on architectures and operations. These attacks
are later used to identify potential threats in the threat analysis process. The attacks are
based on Secure coding: principles and practices [31].
Man-in-the-middle Attack
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is possible if an attacker is able to intercept net-
work traffic between two hosts. He is then able to masquerade as one of the parties and
manipulate data exchanged between the two hosts. As a defense mechanism, compo-
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nents should implement cryptographic algorithms such as transport layer security (TLS),
authentication, session checksums or shared secrets, as for instance cookies.
Race Condition Attack
A race condition attack, also known as Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use-Problem (TOCT-
TOU) involves multiple processes which run in parallel. It could be for example possible
to replace an existing file which is already validated and used by another process to by-
pass initial security checks by the first process. To defend against a race condition attack,
developers need to be aware of differences between atomic an non-atomic operations and
avoid non-atomic operations if possible.
Replay Attack
A replay attack is a network attack which repeats or delays data transmission. It tries to
fool participants into thinking they have successfully completed a protocol transaction.
An example would be the transmission of a password hash, which was used for authen-
tication and has been eavesdropped by an attacker in the network. After saving the
transmission packets, the attacker can start another authentication request and resend
the saved packets containing the password hash to successfully authenticate. Possible
countermeasures are session identifiers, nonces or timestamps which should be integrated
in the authentication process.
Sniffer Attack
Sniffers are tools which allow to monitor network traffic. They can be used by adminis-
trators to diagnose networks, but also by attackers to record sensitive information which
is transmitted in clear text. To defend against a sniffer attack, switches and routers need
to be configured correctly. On application level, TLS can be used to transmit sensitive
data in encrypted form.
Session Hijacking Attack
A session hijacking attack exploits session control mechanisms. For example a web service
needs cookies to identify a user across multiple HTTP requests. If an attacker is able to
steal this cookie, he could use it to establish a valid session and gain access to the web
server.
Denial-of-service Attack
By sending a high amount of traffic to an application, host or network, an attacker could
make a service unavailable for legitimate users. To defend against a Denial-of-service
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Attack (DoS), architecture and network need to be planned to moderately use resources.
CPU, file and memory limits should be applied so that one application is not able to
overload the whole system. A process is needed to monitor resource usage and block
specific incoming traffic if a DoS attack is happening.
Default Accounts Attack
Components are often shipped with default credentials to simplify initial configuration
and installation. Default credentials are an attack vector for attackers, since many lists
with default credentials for all kinds of software already exist. To prevent Default Ac-
counts Attack, default accounts need to be removed in the initial configuration process.
Also processes which automatically test the architecture for default credentials can be
implemented.
Password Cracking Attack
Password Cracking Attacks are a possibility to get access to protected systems which
require credentials. Tools can be used to guess username and password combinations,
either by randomly generating passwords (brute force) or using lists with predefined pass-
words (dictionary attack). To prevent this attack, users need to be trained to use strong
passwords or password policies need to be defined. Also using additional factors, like for
instance biometric characteristics or additional hardware can help to reduce the risk of
this kind of attack.
3.2 Threat Modeling
The basic security objectives and attacks have been defined in the last chapter. In this
chapter a process is defined to find the main threats and to protect information against
those threats.
Threat Modeling is a structured approach to identify threats, risks and mitigations for
a given component or system [107]. It uses abstractions which aid to help thinking about
risks [107]. The main reason for threat modeling is the fact, that secure systems cannot be
built until potential threats for the system are identified and understood [86]. In general a
threat model consists of two models: a model of what is built and a model of threats [107].
The first model is a detailed documentation of the product itself, containing its external
dependencies, the assets and entry points [107]. This information can be used to determine
weak spots, vulnerabilities or risks early and to better understand security requirements
[107]. A threat model can be integrated into an existing software development lifecycle
(SDLC) to increase overall security from the beginning [25]. The model of threats is a
36
3.2 Threat Modeling
detailed list of what can go wrong, once the product has been built [107]. The list of threats
can also be categorized and ranked, which can be used to implement countermeasures and
mitigate those risks [25]. Multiple types of threat modeling exist [27]:
• Software Centric
• Security Centric
• Risk Centric
A software centric approach prioritizes threats upon their effect on functional use cases
or impact on for example reliability of the software [27]. Security centric threat modeling
ranks upon how easy it is to exploit a threat or the technical impact on the product [27].
A risk centric threat model (like for example PASTA) prioritizes after information owners,
business or other stakeholders [25]. In this work a security centric threat modeling process
is used to identify threats on a SSC, since it has a technical focus. A threat modeling
process can be divided into multiple steps:
3.2.1 Step 1: Model System
The first step is necessary to gain an overall understanding of the system and how it
interacts with external entities [107]. It is a structured approach to gain as much in-
formation as possible about the product [107]. To identify how, by whom and in which
circumstances the product is used, use cases can be created as a first step [25]. Also entry
points, assets and trust levels have to be identified and described in an overall threat
model documentation [107]. To easily see how data is passed through the application and
through trust boundaries, data flow diagrams (DFD) can be created [25]. To improve
the models further and to get an overview of potential attack vectors, trust boundaries
should be added [107].
3.2.2 Step 2: Identify Threats
The second step uses a methodology, as for instance STRIDE from the attacker’s point
of view or Application Security Frame (ASF) from the defender’s point of view, in combi-
nation with the created models from the previous step to find possible targets and threats
[25]. Afterwards a ranking methodology, like DREAD can be applied to calculate the
level of risk those threats impose [25].
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3.2.3 STRIDE
SRIDE is used in this work to find potential threats. It is an acronym which aims to help
to identify threats imposed to a product. The description of STRIDE and the explanation
of each letter is based on the sources [107, 86]. The acronym STRIDE stands for:
• S: Spoofing (pretending to be someone else)
• T: Tampering with Data (data is manipulated)
• R: Repudiation (actions are audited and a user can be identified)
• I: Information Disclosure (user gets more information than needed)
• D: Denial of Service (data is not available)
• E: Elevation of Privilege (user is able to gain more privileges)
It was invented by Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg in 1999 [107]. It was designed
to aid people identifying and enumerating types of attacks which threaten systems and
things that could go wrong [107]. It is not intended to be a categorization method, since
many threats cannot be assigned to a single category [107]. In the following paragraphs,
the meaning of each letter in the acronym is explained in detail.
Spoofing
In general, spoofing means an attacker pretends to be something or someone different than
himself. Spoofing can be divided into three basic categories: spoofing a file or process,
spoofing a machine or spoofing a person. Spoofing a file or process can be achieved
by creating a malicious file which has the same name and attributes as the original file,
tricking an application or person into executing it. An example would be renaming a file
to a common name, such as sshd. Spoofing a machine is possible on multiple layers
of a network stack, as for example spoofing ARP requests on layer 2, IP addresses on
layer 3, or DNS packets on layer 7. After a machine has been spoofed, it is possible to
act as a MITM instance and modify network communication. Spoofing a person can
be achieved by using someone’s credentials which have for example been stolen due to
a phishing attack. This could then be used to initiate further attacks with using the
privileges of the spoofed person.
Tampering with Data
Tampering with data means that something is modified in a malicious way. Typically
this happens on local disk, in memory or in the network. An example of a local file is
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a configuration file, which could be modified to lower the encryption strength or allow
anonymous access to a component. If a bug in an application is found, sensitive data in
memory could be modified or stolen. A network attack could involve manipulating data
on the transport way or redirecting traffic to another host machine which is in control of
the attacker.
Repudiation
Repudiation is the act of claiming that a person (not limited to attackers) did not do
something even if they did. This often appears in the business layer, which is above the
application layer. An example would be that someone claims he did not click on the
email attachment after a malware infection. Another example would be, a person claims
that he or she did not accept a package from UPS, although it has been delivered by the
postman. Nonrepudiation could be achieved by using processes to log, retain and analyze
all events which happen throughout the system.
Information Disclosure
Information disclosure happens when an attacker receives information which he is not
authorized to see. This could occur if he has access to processes, data stores or is able to
analyze data flows in the network. Processes can leak information like memory addresses,
which could be used in a later attack to bypass security mechanisms, such as address space
layout randomization (ASLR). Also sensitive data could be leaked in error messages and
stack traces, for example credentials to access a database. Data stores as for instance
databases, swap files, temporary files or hardware devices like USB devices could also
contain sensitive information. They should be protected by setting correct permissions
and adding additional security mechanisms, like for example encryption. Data which is
transmitted unencrypted over the network could also lead to information disclosure.
Denial of Service
As already described in Paragraph Denial-of-service Attack, a denial of service (DoS)
attack is taking all resources of a service to make it unavailable for others. Those re-
sources could be memory, CPU, disk space or network resources. Two categories of DoS
attacks exist: persistent and distributed denial of service (DDoS). Persistent attacks are
for instance cronjobs which survive reboots and create endless loops to consume all CPU
resources. DDoS attacks are done by sending as much traffic as possible to an application
or host to make it inaccessible for others.
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Elevation of Privilege
An Elevation of Privilege attack means an attacker is able to do something he is not
authorized to do. This could be for example executing code as admin user being logged
in as a standard user. Two main ways exist to achieve a privilege escalation: corrupting
processes or bypassing authorization checks. Corrupting a process means sending invalid
input to a process which cannot be interpreted correctly and leads to a buffer overflow.
This could give an attacker control of the application flow and allow him to run custom
code on the host. Bypassing authorization could be possible due to missing authorization
checks or bugs in the authorization component.
3.2.4 Step 3: Address Threats
In step three, the found threats from the previous step are addressed and mitigations are
defined [107]. Different mitigation strategies are listed in Table 3.1 ([107]). The decision
which mitigation strategy should be used for which threat is based on multiple factors,
such as costs of transferring the threat to another party, the likelihood of its occurrence
or costs for avoiding the threat [107]. As a result, a complete list with all threats and
calculated risk levels mapped onto the mitigation strategies is created [107]. The final
resulting document is the threat model for the given product [25].
Method Explanation
Mitigating Threats Make it harder to take advantage of a
threat, for example by adding an addi-
tional layer of security.
Eliminating Threats Eliminate the threat completely, for exam-
ple by removing the feature which is in-
volved.
Transferring Threats Transfer risk to someone else, for example
an insurance.
Accepting Threats Do nothing.
Table 3.1: Mitigation Strategies
3.2.5 Step 4: Validate
The last step is to validate the work which was done in the previous steps [107]. The
initial model and the threats have to be reviewed and updated in an iterative process
[107]. For example complete data flows can be added based on the additional information
gained in step two or three [107].
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3.2.6 Detailed Approach
The approach in this work follows the described threat modeling process from the last
chapters. First, a SSC is described and models are created to show the overall attack
surface and trust boundaries. Afterwards, threats are identified using attacks described
earlier as an aid. Based on the likelihood and impact the final risk levels are calculated
afterwards. To get an overview of the risks exposed to each component, the values low,
medium and high can be assigned to the likelihood and impact. The meaning of the
values for likelihood are explained in Table 3.2. The values for impact are explained
in Table 3.3. The final risk value can be calculated using the 3x3 matrix shown in
Figure 3.1. This matrix is used to illustrate the level of risk which can then be discussed.
The meaning of the calculated risk values are defined in Table 3.4. After calculating
the risk, treatments are assigned, countermeasures and methods are explained and the
residual risk is discussed. Step four is done implicitly in this work by iteratively reviewing
the found threats and comparing them to the countermeasures which have been discussed.
Value Explanation
Low Unlikely, there is a small possibility it might occur.
Medium It is likely to occur as there is a history of casual occurrences.
High The threat is expected to occur, since it happened frequently in the past.
Table 3.2: Values for Likelihood
Value Explanation
Low Minor financial or reputational impact.
Medium Moderate financial or reputational impact.
High High financial or reputational impact.
Table 3.3: Values for Impact
Value Explanation
Low The risk is acceptable as it is unlikely to occur or cause damage.
Medium The risk can cause damage, and should be addressed.
High Not acceptable, likely to cause damage and it needs to be addressed.
Table 3.4: Risk Level Values
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Figure 3.1: Risk Matrix
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4 Modeling a Software Supply Chain
This chapter describes and models a SSC. Since the SSC is built on Docker as base
technology, this work focuses on technical aspects of a SSC. Therefore topics as for instance
integration into business processes, key management strategies or compliance rules are out
of scope. Topics such as logging and monitoring processes are also out of scope, since they
should be implemented organization-wide, not limited to SSCs. This chapter is the first
step of the threat modeling process. As described in Chapter Software Supply Chain, a
SSC consists of the following parts: sources and dependencies, build systems and engineers,
network, application repository and deployed system. This chapter’s structure is based on
the parts of the SSC.
4.1 Overview
A general overview of environments of a SSC and its borders can be found in Figure 4.1.
The local environment is the laptop or stationary machine for each developer, which
provides tools to maintain the application. The development environment contains the
central VCS, which is used to share code among developers. To ensure high code quality
and continuous builds, a CI pipeline is required, which is mainly located in the build
environment. The central part of the CI pipeline is the build server running an automation
software. The testing environment runs the application in a Docker Swarm which is
similar to the production environment, but access is limited to the testing teams (labeled
as Tester). It is a flattened clone of the production environment and is used to test
the latest features within a production-like environment. The database data is copied
from the production database, but typically anonymized. This means that the real data
cannot be reconstructed. The production environment is the main container cluster which
provides access to the application for the end user. It uses real data and is typically scaled
across multiple nodes behind a load balancer to handle incoming traffic bursts.
4.2 Sources / Dependencies
In this chapter all topics related to source code and dependencies are explained. These
are the source code of the application itself and the Docker images which are used to run
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Figure 4.1: General Overview
the application in a container cluster.
4.2.1 The Source Code
The source code is the main asset in the SSC and needs to be protected using the CIA
objectives. The application which is exemplary used is shown in Figure 4.2. It consists
of a single container which provides a web application on port 80. For this work a small
HTML document is used, which shows a simple Hello World (Attachment 1). As shown in
Figure 4.2, the end user can access the application container on port 80. The application
Docker image installs some additional dependencies, such as nginx onto the OS base
image.
Figure 4.2: Application Overview
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The complete application can be found in the attached source code in the application/
folder. To build and run the application, Docker Compose can be used. The file docker-
compose.yml (Attachment 9) describes a single service called application. The code within
the containers is located in the folder /var/www/app. The docker-compose.yml file is
used for development, this is why the local code folder is mounted as a volume into both
services. This allows the developer to change the source code and see the changes directly
in the browser, without the need to rebuild the containers. The docker-compose.prod.
yml (Attachment 8) has the same structure as the docker-compose.yml, but uses the
Dockerfile which resides in the docker/production/application/ folder (Attachment
4). Those Dockerfiles additionally copy the whole code/ folder into the final image, to
make sure it has access to the source code when running in the testing or production
environment.
4.2.2 Docker Images
Docker images provide a consistent environment for an application or service and bundle
all required dependencies. These images can be used to run a complete application on
different infrastructures, such as a local Docker Engine installation for development or a
productive Docker Swarm.
OS Base Image
The OS base image is used as basis for all further Docker images. It is used for the
following components:
• The sample application
• The build server
• The VCS server
• The Registries
It provides the basic OS layer which is comparable to for example the Ubuntu [73] or
Debian base image [46]. It needs to provide basic OS functionality, as for instance a
network stack. It should be as small as possible to save disk space and contain only the
required dependencies to reduce the overall attack surface. The base image should be
built from SCRATCH ([69]) in a separate CI pipeline, which is out of scope of this work
since this image should be built organization-wide and not only for this SSC. Instead of
the OS base image, this work uses images from Docker Hub to run the application.
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Application Docker Image
The application image is used to containerize the sample application. It is based on
the OS base image and contains additional dependencies like nginx to run the frontend.
Nginx runs in background and listens on port 80.
Build Server Docker Image
The build server image is based on the OS base image and contains the automation
software plus additional dependencies, as for example Apache Ant or Python. In this
work, Jenkins is used, as explained in Chapter Build Server. More dependencies can
be required if for example additional security checks are applied on the source code.
To build and deploy the testing image, access to a Docker Engine is required. In this
work the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) from the build server is mounted into
the Jenkins container, to allow the container to get access to the host’s Docker En-
gine. The docker-compose.yml file for this example (Attachment 12) can be found in
the buildserver/ folder in the attachment. To run the Jenkins server, docker stack
deploy --compose-file docker-compose.yml jenkins needs to be run.
VCS Docker Image
The VCS image is also based on the OS base image and contains additional software
and dependencies to provide a VCS server. Software that might be used is for example
gitolite ([11]) or GitLab ([9]). As described in Chapter VCS, gitolite is used in this work.
The docker-compose.yml file for the gitolite repository can be found in the attached
source code in the vcs/ folder (Attachment 13). To start the sample gitolite repository,
the command docker stack deploy --compose-file docker-compose.yml gitolite
can be run in a Docker Swarm cluster.
Registry Docker Image
In this work the Docker Registry is used as described in Chapter Registry. The docker-
compose.yml file for the registry can be found in the attached folder registry/ (Attach-
ment 14). To run the registry, docker stack deploy --compose-file docker-compose.yml
registry has to be executed in a Docker Swarm.
4.3 Build Systems / Engineers
This section describes all topics related to build systems or engineers. These are for
example the general development, build and deployment processes, local environments
which are used to develop applications, or the build server.
46
4.3 Build Systems / Engineers
4.3.1 The CI Pipeline
Development Process
Developers regularly push their changes into the central VCS, as shown in the general
development workflow in Figure 4.3. The VCS then notifies the build server to trigger a
pull, test and build. This is described in more detail in Chapter Build Process. After the
tests and build have been finished, the developer receives a notification whether it was
successful or not. This is done by a notification service, such as be Slack [76] or email.
To provide a better overview, the deployment step was omitted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Development Process
Build Process
When a push into the VCS happens, the build server is notified by the VCS. When
receiving such a notification, the build process is triggered, as shown in Figure 4.4. It
starts by pulling the latest changes out of the VCS. Next, tests are executed, which could
for example be unit, integration or smoke tests. Afterwards, source code analysis tools can
be run, as for instance phpcs ([85]) or phpmd ([102]) in case of a PHP application. After
running the tests and checks, the results are parsed and interpreted by the automation
software. If one of the tests failed or the source code analysis has thrown warnings above
a certain threshold, the build server stops and sends a notification. This notification is
sent to the developer who was responsible for the last push. He then needs to fix the
source code until the tests work again.
If the tests and source code analysis tools successfully finished their work, the Docker im-
ages for the application are built. In general, docker build -t <tag> -f <Dockerfile>
can be executed to build a Docker image. This command parses the Dockerfile, builds
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Figure 4.4: Build Process
a new Docker image and copies the source code into the new image. Docker Compose
simplifies the build process by providing all necessary information in a single docker-
compose.yml file. To build the application, docker-compose build can be run in the
application/ folder. To build the image for the testing environment, the file docker-
compose.prod.yml is required. It extends the regular docker-compose.yml file by copy-
ing the source code into the image. The necessary commands are bundled in the attached
build.sh file (Attachment 6), which automatically uses the docker-compose.prod.yml
file.
Deployment to Testing
When the build process has been completed, the image can be pushed into the testing
registry. This step is included in Figure 4.4. Pushing the image into the testing registry
is achieved by running docker-compose push and using the docker-compose.prod.yml
file. The combined command can be found in the push.sh file (Attachment 11). If auto-
mated deployment is enabled, the automation software calls the deployment script, which
tells the testing container cluster to pull and run the latest image version. In general, a de-
ployment works by running docker stack deploy --compose-file <docker-compose
file> <app name> on the host machine. To execute the command, the build server needs
SSH access to the testing swarm. The deployment command is included in the deploy.sh
script (Attachment 7). It copies the current docker-compose.prod.yml onto the test-
ing host and runs docker stack deploy --compose-file docker-compose.prod.yml
application. After deploying the latest image to the testing cluster, the testers are now
able to test this version.
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Deployment to Production
After the application image has been tested by the testing team, it needs to be deployed
to the production environment. This process is shown in Figure 4.5. An operator pulls the
image from the testing registry and pushes it into the production registry. After the im-
age has been pushed, the operator needs to run docker stack deploy --compose-file
docker-compose.prod.yml <app name> on the production swarm to pull and roll out
the new containers.
Figure 4.5: Deployment to Production
4.3.2 Local Environment
The local environment is used to work on the source code of the application. It represents
the computer or laptop of each developer. It needs to support developers at their daily
work and make development as easy as possible. If possible, all developers should work
on the same operating system and use the same toolset to make the whole process as
consistent as possible. To build and run images locally, Docker Engine needs to be
installed. The software versions used to run the application have to be the same as in
testing / production to avoid errors based on different versions of the server software.
This is achieved by using Dockerfiles which are similar to those which are used for
production (Attachment 2). On the contrary to the testing / production environment,
the local environment should offer additional features like debugging or syntax checking.
Debug information of the application should be limited to this environment to avoid
unwanted information leaks. The database data used while developing should be sample
data or a fully anonymized production dump.
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4.3.3 Build Server
The build server plays a central role in the SSC. As the name implies, it is used to
regularly build, test and deploy the application. Its central part is an automation software
which runs as a container in a Docker Swarm and listens to changes in the VCS. If
a change occurs, it automatically pulls the latest source code and processes it further.
Some exemplary automation servers are Jenkins [24], Travis CI [113], Buildbot [94] or
Bamboo [1]. In this work Jenkins is used as the automation server, as it is open source
and one of the most distributed automation software with over 100,000 installations [82].
4.4 Network
In this section the communication of the components in the SSC is described. It is based
on the general overview, which is shown in Figure 4.1. A developer needs to access the
VCS to push the source code. The build server needs to communicate with the VCS to
exchange notifications and the source code. It also needs to push the resulting Docker
images into the testing registry. The end user needs to be able to access the application
in the production environment. The complete and secured network layout is described in
Chapter Network Overview, after the threat modeling process.
4.5 Application Repository
The application repository section contains all topics which are related to providing access
to source code or to Docker images. These are the central VCS and different image
registries.
4.5.1 VCS
The VCS is the central code repository for developers. It is run as a Docker container
in a Docker Swarm. In this work, gitolite [11] (On Docker Hub: [50]) is used as a
sample repository, as it provides the required functionalities like for example public key
authentication.
4.5.2 Registry
In this work Docker Registry is used, as it provides the basic functionalities. Multiple
registries are required:
• Testing Registry
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• Production Registry
• Internal Registry
The testing and production registries hold Docker images for their environments. They
run in the corresponding Docker swarm to limit access to the registries. In addition to the
swarm, the testing registry should be accessible for the build server and operators to allow
pushes. The production registry access should be limited to operators for deployment.
Internal is a general purpose registry, which is used to save additional images like for the
VCS or build server. Since the internal registry does not only contain images for the SSC
and can be used organization-wide, it is out of scope of this work.
4.6 Deployed Systems
In this section the deployed systems are described. These are mainly container clusters
which are used to run application containers. Since Docker abstracts away the infrastruc-
ture and Docker Engine runs on different operating systems, the base infrastructure is
out of scope of this work.
4.6.1 Docker Swarm
Container clusters are required to run and schedule an application image onto multiple
nodes. An overview of required container clusters and the applications which run in those
clusters is shown in Table 4.1.
Environment Application
Development VCS
Build Build Server
Testing Sample Application, Testing Registry
Production Sample Application, Production Registry
Table 4.1: Required Container Clusters
Since this work is based on Docker, Docker Swarm is used as container cluster (both
denominations are used as synonyms, as well as swarm). Docker Engine needs to be
installed on all nodes to form a swarm.
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This chapter is step two in the threat modeling process. First, the main components,
users, dataflows and trust boundaries are listed based on Chapter Modeling a Software
Supply Chain. Afterwards the main components of the SSC are analyzed and threats are
identified using STRIDE.
5.1 Components, Users and Trust Boundaries
This chapter lists the main components, users, trust boundaries and dataflows which are
required for a SSC. All are labeled with a unique ID in ascending order to later reference
them.
5.1.1 Exclusions
Table 5.1 shows components which are excluded as well as the reasons for excluding them.
Excluded Component Reason
Sample Application As the name states, this is an exemplary
application which does not contain sensi-
tive data. The threat model of the sam-
ple application is out of scope of this
work, since analyzing the sample applica-
tion does not provide an additional value
for the SSC.
Table 5.1: Excluded Components
5.1.2 List of Components
In Table 5.2 the main components of the SSC are listed and a unique identifier is assigned.
5.1.3 List of Users
In Table 5.3 the main users which are part of the SSC are listed and a unique identifier
is assigned.
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Component ID
Docker Images C1
Local Environment C2
VCS C3
Build Server C4
Registry C5
Docker Swarm C6
Table 5.2: List of Components
User ID
Developer U1
Tester U2
End User U3
Infrastructure Operator U4
Table 5.3: List of Users
5.1.4 List of Dataflows
In Table 5.4 all dataflows of a SSC are listed and a unique identifier is assigned. It is
based on the description of Chapter Network.
Source Destination Protocol Description ID
Local Environ-
ment
VCS SSH Push and pull
source code
D1
VCS Build Server HTTP / HTTPS Notify change D2
Build Server VCS SSH Pull source code D3
Build Server Testing Registry Docker Registry
HTTP API V2
Push image D4
Build Server Testing Docker
Swarm
SSH Deploy D5
Tester Application
(Testing)
Any Test application D6
End User Application (Pro-
duction)
Any Use application D7
Infastructure Op-
erator
All SSH Build and main-
tain infrastruc-
ture, manage
credentials.
D8
Table 5.4: List of Dataflows
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5.1.5 List of Trust Boundaries
In Table 5.5 relevant trust boundaries of a SSC are listed and a unique identifier is
assigned. In Figure 5.1 the boundaries are shown visually. Trust boundaries are defined
according to the data they contain. The local and development environment contain
the source code of the application but no real user data. The build server processes the
source code, and additionally has access to the testing registry and testing swarm. The
testing environment hosts the application for the testers. The production environment is
a completely separated trust boundary since real data is used.
Figure 5.1: Trust Boundaries
Components and Users ID
Development Environment TB1
Build Environment TB2
Testing Environment TB3
Production Environment TB4
External / End User TB5
Table 5.5: List of Trust Boundaries
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5.1.6 Data Flow Diagram
The data flow diagram for a SSC is shown in Figure 5.2. All data flows from Table 5.4,
trust boundaries from Table 5.5 and users from Table 5.3 are included, except dataflow
D8, which accesses all environments and user U4 for the same reason.
Figure 5.2: Data Flow Diagram
5.2 Threat Modeling
This chapter analyzes the components listed in Chapter Components, Users and Trust
Boundaries and identifies threats. To find threats, STRIDE in combination with the
defined attacks from Chapter Attacks is used. The base layout for the threat analysis for
each component is a table consisting of rows representing each letter of the word STRIDE.
Additionally, each threat is labeled with a unique identifier (starting with T), which will
be used as a reference in later chapters.
5.2.1 Exclusions
To simplify the threat models, common threats, as for example default credentials are
excluded. A list of excluded threats and the reasons are listed in Table 5.6.
5.2.2 Components
Docker Images (C1)
The threat model for the Docker images is shown in Table 5.7.
Local Environment (C2)
The threat model for the local environment is shown in Table 5.8. Threats such as
malware or local privilege escalation vulnerabilities are not listed, since they belong to
the excluded category OS level threats.
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Excluded Threat Reason
Default credentials Default credentials are excluded, because
this threat can be addressed by setting up
the infrastructure in an automated process
and should be taken care of in each com-
ponent.
OS level threats OS level threats like for example SSH or
bash vulnerabilities are excluded to reduce
the focus on the main components of a
SSC. On each OS, base hardening mech-
anisms should be applied.
Disabled (audit) logs Logs should be enabled everywhere and
a central logging service should be estab-
lished. Since a central logging infrastruc-
ture is a separate mechanism, it is out of
scope of this work.
Rogue internal Rogue internals, as for instance a rogue
operator are not a threat limited to SSCs.
They should be mitigated organization-
wide.
Table 5.6: Excluded Threats
S -
T * Backdoored images in public registries (T1.1)
* Image forgery while transmitting (T1.2)
R -
I * Vulnerabilities (T1.3)
* Backdoors (T1.1)
* Hardcoded information (for example credentials or IPs) (T1.4)
D * Vulnerabilities (T1.3)
* Untested latest tag (T1.5)
E * Privilege escalation vulnerability (T1.3)
Table 5.7: Threat Analysis for Docker Base Image
S -
T * Source code manipulation (T2.1)
R -
I * Credential leak (T2.2)
* Source code leak (T2.3)
D * Loss of credentials (T2.4)
E * Vulnerability in development tools (T2.5)
* Misconfigured Docker Engine (Socket exposed to network) (T2.6)
Table 5.8: Threat Analysis for Local Environment
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VCS (C3)
The threat model for the VCS is shown in Table 5.9.
S * Authentication / authorization bypass (T3.1)
T * Unauthorized push (T3.2)
* MITM while pulling / pushing source code (T3.3)
* Destroying source code (T3.6)
R -
I * Vulnerability in software (T3.4)
D * Too many interactions at the same time (T3.5)
E * Vulnerability in software (T3.4)
* Authentication / authorization bypass (T3.1)
Table 5.9: Threat Analysis for the VCS
Build Server (C4)
The threat model for the build server is shown in Table 5.10. The OWASP Top 10 security
risks for web applications is used to analyze the web interface [99].
S * Broken authentication or session management (T4.1)
* Leaked credentials (T4.2)
* Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (T4.3)
T * Unauthenticated access (T4.4)
* MITM (T4.5)
R -
I * Injection attack (T4.6)
* MITM (T4.5)
* XSS (T4.3)
* Leaked credentials (T4.2)
D * Too many parallel builds (T4.7)
* Vulnerability in software (T4.8)
E * Broken authentication or session management (T4.1)
* Vulnerability in software (T4.8)
* Injection attack (T4.6)
* Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (T4.9)
* XSS (T4.3)
* Host compromise with Docker socket (T4.10)
Table 5.10: Threat Analysis for the Build Server
Registry (C5)
The threat model for image registries in testing and production environment is shown in
Table 5.11.
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S * Broken authentication (T5.1)
T * Unauthenticated push (T5.2)
* Image forgery while pushing / pulling (T5.3)
R -
I * Vulnerabilty in registry software (T5.4)
* MITM while pushing or pulling images (T5.5)
D * Too many interactions (T5.6)
* Image use too much space (T5.7)
E * Vulnerability in registry software (T5.4)
Table 5.11: Threat Analysis for the Registry
Docker Swarm (C6)
The threat model for the Docker Swarm which runs in testing and production is shown
in Table 5.12.
S -
T * Network exposed Docker socket (T6.1)
R -
I * Network exposed Docker socket (T6.1)
* MITM between master and nodes (T6.2)
* Leaked credentials (for example for DB) (T6.3)
D * Network exposed Docker socket (T6.1)
* Container memory / CPU exhaustion (T6.4)
E * Network exposed Docker socket (T6.1)
* Container to host breakout (T6.5)
Table 5.12: Threat Analysis for the Docker Swarm
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Based on the identified threats, this chapter calculates the risks, discusses security mech-
anisms to mitigate, eliminate, transfer or accept those risks and assesses the residual risk.
The discussion includes security design principles which were introduced in Chapter Se-
curity Principles. The general goal of this chapter is to show the residual risk of an attack
on each component and possible solutions to secure information which is passed through
the SSC regarding the CIA objectives.
6.1 Network Overview
Before evaluating the components, an overview of the network communication is given.
The network layout is shown in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Network Overview
By creating logically separated subnets, each component can be isolated from each other
and trust boundaries can be protected (Defense in Depth). Due to sensitive data, the
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production environment should additionally be physically separated. The subnets should
be able to communicate with each other through firewalls (labeled as FW in Figure 6.1).
Those firewalls contain access control lists (ACLs), which allow minimal traffic which is
defined in the dataflows in Chapter List of Dataflows (Principle of Least Privilege). The
default rule is to deny all other traffic (deny-all). By using this concept, it is harder for
an attacker to move from one component to the other (lateral movement [121]), even if
he managed to infiltrate one of the components. Each cloud in Figure 6.1 represents a
subnet. The trust boundaries from Chapter List of Trust Boundaries are marked with
double lines. Each crossing from one trust boundary into another is secured by a fire-
wall. The communication from the local environment to the development environment
can be unidirectional, since the developers only need to exchange source code with the
VCS. The VCS does not need to initiate a connection back. The communication between
development and build environment has to be bidirectional, since the VCS needs to con-
nect to the build server and vice versa. The communication from the build server to the
testing environment is unidirectional, since the build server has to push the final Docker
image. No connection back should be allowed, in case the testing environment has been
compromised.
Additionally, a management network is required to allow operators to maintain the
infrastructure (Defense in Depth). It needs unidirectional access to all environments. All
management interfaces, as for instance SSH ports, should be able to communicate with
the management network only. The management network contains jump servers, which
are accessible by operators and contain keys to access the different environments. These
keys are for example SSH private keys.
6.2 Components
6.2.1 Docker Images (C1)
Docker images form the base layer for many components of the SSC (for example the VCS,
the build server or the testing and production application). To provide an overview, each
found threat mapped to its likelihood, impact, risk and mitigation strategy is shown in
Table 6.1.
Explanations
T1.1: The likelihood of backdoors is low if developers are constrained to use public image
from official repositories only. The impact is high since if a backdoor stays undetected,
an attacker would be able to gain access to production data.
T1.2: Image forgery is limited to attackers which have access to the internal network.
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Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T1.1 (back-
door)
low high medium eliminate
T1.2 (image
forgery)
low high medium eliminate
T1.3 (vulnera-
bilities)
high high high mitigate
T1.4 (hard-
coded informa-
tion)
medium medium medium mitigate
T1.5 (untested
latest tag)
low low low eliminate
Table 6.1: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C1)
The impact is high since manipulating an image and for example adding a backdoor would
give an attacker access to production data.
T1.3: Vulnerabilities are very likely to occur since every dependency can be affected.
If an attacker is able to exploit the vulnerability, he could gain access to production data.
T1.4: Hardcoded credentials are likely to occur, especially in new teams or if a new
developer joins a team. The impact is medium since an attacker needs access to a registry
to read out the credentials of an image.
T1.5: An untested latest tag is unlikely to occur, since container clusters can be config-
ured to not use them. If it still happens, an untested feature could be deployed to testing
or production, which exposes a medium risk.
Mitigation Strategies
To eliminate threat T1.1 (backdoor) and mitigate T1.3 (vulnerabilities), a separate in-
ternal CI pipeline is required, which builds the Docker base image. The resulting image
is then used as base image for further Docker images, as for example the VCS. Devel-
opers should be constrained to use this image as basis to build their custom images. If
possible, the base Docker image should be built using SCRATCH ([69]) and only bun-
dle the necessary dependencies, to reduce the overall attack surface (Minimize Attack
Surface Area). Tools such as SSH are not required in the image, due to the immutable
infrastructure paradigm. The initial effort to build a custom base Docker image is high,
since all required dependencies have to be identified, installed and tested. Nevertheless it
addresses two basic threats (T1.1 and T1.3) and gives control over the installed software
(Don’t Trust Service, in this case Docker Hub images). To further reduce vulnerabilities
in the Docker base image, additional security scanners, like for example Clair [17], can
be integrated into the CI pipeline. The results of the static analysis have to be analyzed
and depending on the risk, patches have to be applied or dependencies removed.
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Threat T1.3 can also be addressed by hardening the base OS image after all required
dependencies have been installed. Possible strategies to harden images and containers are
described in detail in the paper Understanding and Hardening Linux Containers [33].
T1.4 (hardcoded credentials) is mainly a mistake by developers. To mitigate hard-
coded credentials, a proper secret management strategy needs to be introduced. This
involves using Docker Secrets as secret management platform, which allows to secretly
store information in the encrypted raft log. Since developers are not able to manage the
Docker Swarms in testing and production environment, an operator has to configure the
swarms and make sure the required credentials are mounted to the correct path in the
running containers. Secrets which are required for a service are configured by develop-
ers in the final docker-compose.prod.yml, but this configuration does not contain the
values of the secrets itself. The process looks as follows: developers configure the secrets
in the docker-compose.prod.yml file and ask operators to create or update the corre-
sponding secrets in the testing or production swarm. After the secrets have been created,
the application can be deployed and automatically receives the required credentials when
started.
Threat T1.5 (untested latest tag) should be taken care of in the complete development
and deployment process (it is also seen as an anti-pattern [35]). The latest tag is used
as default tag, if no other tag has been specified. If a developer or the build server
accidentally tags an untested or unstable image as latest, it is possible that this image is
executed in production environment. This threat can be eliminated by configuring the
target environment to always use a specific version tag.
Additionally, to mitigate threat T1.4 and T1.5, compliance rules can be introduced
which developers have to follow. Those rules could for example be to avoid any confidential
data in Docker images or to use a secure coding process.
The elimination of T1.2 (image forgery) by using DCT will be explained in chapter
Registry (C5).
Residual Risk
Three out of five threats could be eliminated by the described mechanisms. The remaining
threats (T1.3 with risk high and T1.4 with risk medium) can be mitigated but leave a
residual risk for Docker images.
6.2.2 Local Environment (C2)
To create a secure baseline for local environments, basic OS hardening should be applied,
like for instance account passwords, encrypted hard drive or firewalls (Establish Secure
Defaults). The details to basic hardening is out of the scope of this work, since hardening
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guides for different operating systems already exist, such as the CIS Ubuntu Linux 16.04
LTS Benchmark ([23]). An overview of identified threats mapped to likelihood, impact,
risk and a mitigation strategy can be found in Table 6.2.
Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T2.1 (source
code manipula-
tion)
low high medium mitigate
T2.2 (creden-
tial leaks)
medium high high mitigate
T2.3 (source
code leak)
low medium low mitigate
T2.4 (loss of
credentials)
low low low accept
T2.5 (vulnera-
bilities)
high high high mitigate
T2.6 (miscon-
figuration)
low high medium eliminate
Table 6.2: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C2)
Explanations
T2.1: The likelihood of source code manipulation is low, since the attacker needs to gain
access to the local environment and the developers should review their changes before
pushing into the VCS. The impact is high, since the attacker could place backdoors which
have access to production data.
T2.2: Credential leaks are likely as humans are the weakest point of a system. Creden-
tials could be stolen for example by a phishing attack or exploiting a vulnerability in the
local environment. The impact is high, since an attacker could gain access to the VCS
and push manipulated source code.
T2.3: A source code leak happens if an attacker gains access to the local environment,
therefore they are unlikely. The impact is medium, since an attacker could easier find
bugs which he could exploit in production.
T2.4: The loss of credentials is unlikely, since a developer should create backups of his
local machine. The impact is also low, since new credentials and keys can be generated
by an operator.
T2.5: Vulnerabilities on the local system are to be expected. The impact is high, since
an attacker could gain root access on the local machine.
T2.6: A misconfigured Docker Engine is unlikely, since Docker does not expose the
socket by default. The impact of an exposed socket is high, since the attacker would gain
root on the local machine.
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Mitigation Strategies
If an attacker gained access to a local environment, he is able to manipulate the source
code which then could be pushed into the VCS (T2.1). This threat can be mitigated by
manually reviewing each source code change before pushing into the VCS. This could be
achieved by using a code review process, such as pair programming ([118]) or working
with pull requests, which have to be reviewed by other developers.
To protect local credentials and mitigate T2.2 (credential leak), a password manager,
like for example 1Password ([39]) or KeePassX ([112]) should to be used. Additionally,
the private SSH keys should be protected with a password, which must be entered on each
key access (Defense in Depth). To avoid phishing attacks, a developer should be careful
when opening emails or clicking on links. Additionally, security awareness seminars can
be realized for developers.
T2.3 (source code leak) can be mitigated by hardening the base system and carefully
handling the source code. This means that the source code should never leave the local
environment anywhere else than to the VCS.
To mitigate T2.4 (credential loss), regular backups should be created and a restore
process has to be defined.
To reduce the threat of a privilege escalation caused by vulnerabilities in the develop-
ment tools (T2.5) or misconfiguration of the local environment (T2.6), regular security
patches need to be applied. Also the configuration of the local development tools need to
be reviewed and hardenings should be applied. This could for instance be the configura-
tion of the Docker Engine to not expose the socket to the network (Establishing Secure
Defaults). To eliminate threat (T2.6), default configuration can be provided by the IT
security department.
Residual Risk
Threat T2.6 could be eliminated by providing secure configurations to the developers.
T2.4 can be accepted since likelihood, impact and risk are low. Threat T2.2 and T2.5
with risk high, T2.1 with risk medium and T2.3 with risk low present a residual risk which
should be mitigated using the solutions describe above.
6.2.3 VCS (C3)
The VCS contains the source code of the application. An overview of identified threats
mapped to likelihood, impact, risk and a mitigation strategy can be found in Table 6.3.
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Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T3.1 (authenti-
cation bypass)
low high medium mitigate
T3.2 (unautho-
rized push)
low high medium eliminate
T3.3 (MITM) medium medium medium eliminate
T3.4 (vulnera-
bilities)
high high high mitigate
T3.5 (interac-
tions)
low medium low mitigate
T3.6 (destroy-
ing source
code)
low high medium mitigate
Table 6.3: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C3)
Explanations
T3.1: The likelihood of authentication bypasses is medium, since they could be achieved
using vulnerabilities in the software. The impact of an authentication bypass is high,
since an attacker could push manipulated source code.
T3.2: Unauthorized pushes are unlikely to happen, since authentication and autho-
rization should be enabled. The impact is high, since an attacker could push manipulated
source code.
T3.3: MITM attacks are likely to happen since if an attacker has access to the network
traffic, he can easily sniff it. The impact is medium since sensitive information could be
leaked.
T3.4: Vulnerabilities are very likely to occur and have a high impact since they could
be abused to gain unauthorized access to the VCS or the host system.
T3.5: The likelihood of too many interactions happening in parallel is low, since devel-
opers push their changes irregularly. The impact is medium, since the build server would
not be triggered and deployments could not be made.
T3.6: The likelihood of source code being destroyed is low, since regular backups should
be created. The impact is high, since the main asset would be lost.
Mitigation Strategies
To prevent unauthorized attackers from pushing manipulated source code (T3.2) into
the VCS, authentication and authorization has to be enabled. This can be achieved by
using public key authentication. Each developer generates a pair of a private and a public
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key and hands over the public key to the operator. The operator configures the VCS
to allow authentication with the private key corresponding to the public key. Now the
developer is able to push and pull source code using his private key. Each private key
should be held in a safe place and protected by a password, to prevent a credential leak
(T2.2) (Principle of Defense in Depth). Alternatively a username password combination
can be used, which has to be entered on each authentication. The password should be
secure ([32]) and kept in a safe place, by using for example a password manager. To
control access to each repository, authorization should be enabled in the VCS. The access
of each developer should limited to the repositories on which he is currently working
(Principle of Least Privilege).
To mitigate vulnerabilities (T3.4), which could also allow an authentication bypass
(T3.1), regular security patches to the VCS have to be applied.
Another threat is a MITM attack when transferring source code (T3.3). To eliminate
this attack, an encrypted channel has to be used to push and pull source code. This could
be for example SSH, which also comes with public key authentication. If a connection
is initially established, the fingerprint of the server’s public key has to be validated to
ensure the communication is done with the correct server. To further reduce the threat
of source code forgery, transmission over insecure protocols, as for instance HTTP should
be disabled (Minimize Attack Surface Area).
To reduce the denial of service threat by having too many interactions at the same
time (T3.5), a resource limit for the server and an access limit for the developer should
be configured.
To mitigate the threat of destroyed source code (T3.6), regular backups of the source
code and the VCS have to be created.
Residual Risk
Threats T3.2 and T3.3 could be eliminated. T3.4 with risk high leaves a high residual
risk which should be addressed by using additional processes or compliance rules for patch
management. T3.1 and T3.6 with risk medium also leave a residual risk and should be
watched. Threat T3.5 leaves a small residual risk, due to the low risk rating.
6.2.4 Build Server (C4)
The build server is a central component, crosses two trust boundaries (TB1 / TB2 and
TB2 / TB3), and operates on sensitive source code. An overview of identified threats
mapped to likelihood, impact, risk and a mitigation strategy can be found in Table 6.4.
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Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T4.1 (broken
auth)
medium high medium mitigate
T4.2 (leaked
credentials)
low high medium mitigate
T4.3 (XSS) high medium high mitigate
T4.4 (unau-
thenticated
access)
low high medium eliminate
T4.5 (MITM) medium medium medium eliminate
T4.6 (injection
attack)
high high high mitigate
T4.7 (parallel
builds)
low medium low mitigate
T4.8 (vulnera-
bilities)
high high high mitigate
T4.9 (CSRF) medium high high mitigate
T4.10 (host
compromise)
low high medium accept
Table 6.4: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C4)
Explanations
T4.1: The likelihood of a broken authentication mechanism is medium, since vulnerabil-
ities could lead to such a failure. The impact is high, since an attacker could get access
to source code and the testing environment.
T4.2: Leaked credentials are unlikely, since the build server should be separated from
other environments. The impact is high, since an attacker could gain access to the testing
environment and manipulate source code.
T4.3: XSS attacks in the webinterface are very likely, since OWASP Top 10 security
risks for web applications defines them as very widespread [99]. Attackers could for
example steal cookies and hijack a user session, which makes this a medium impact.
T4.4: Unauthenticated access is unlikely to happen, since authentication and autho-
rization should be enabled. The impact is high, since an attacker could gain access to
sensitive data.
T4.5: A MITM attack is likely to happen if the attacker has access to the network
traffic. The impact is medium, since an attacker could sniff sensitive data which is sent
unencrypted over the network.
T4.6: Injection attacks are very likely to happen since they are easy to exploit and a
common threat [99]. The impact is high, since an attacker could gain access to sensitive
information or even get access to the complete host.
T4.7: Too many parallel builds are unlikely to happen, since developers commit and
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push infrequently, which spreads the workload. The impact is medium, since it could
postpone deployments.
T4.8: Vulnerabilities are very likely to occur and have a high impact, since an attacker
could gain root access on the host machine.
T4.9: CSRF attacks are common and they are easy to detect [99], which makes them
likely. The impact is medium, since an attacker can do what the current logged in person
is privileged to do.
T4.10: A host compromise is unlikely, since per default the Docker socket is not exposed
to the network. The impact is high, since it leads to an instant compromise of the host.
Mitigation Strategies
To enable authentication and authorization and eliminate T4.4, global security in Jenk-
ins should be activated and anonymous access disabled (Establish Secure Defaults). As
user realm multiple options exist, such as Jenkin’s own database, LDAP or Unix users
and groups [82]. Access to Jenkins configuration should be limited to operators, to avoid
misconfiguration of the build processes (Principle of Least Privilege). This also prevents
developers from bypassing integrated security mechanisms in the pipeline, like for example
security or compliance checks could lead to the build failing in case a security requirement
has not been met.
The threat of a broken authentication or session management (T4.1) can be reduced by
regularly installing the latest security patches to the automation software and disabling
unneeded features, as for instance the integrated CLI which exposes vulnerabilities like
java deserialization bugs [82] (Minimize Attack Surface Area). This also mitigates the
threat of vulnerabilities in the software (T4.8), XSS (T4.3), injection attacks (T4.6) and
CSRF (T4.9).
The build server requires credentials for the following actions:
• VCS: Pull source code
• Testing Registry: Push Docker image
• Testing Docker Swarm: Access to deploy the application using SSH
• Email / Slack: Send notifications to developers
To reduce the threat of leaked credentials (T4.2), they should be managed using Jenkin’s
Credentials plugin which encrypts the keys using the combination of a master and inter-
mediate keys [115]. To further reduce the threat, access to managing credentials should
be limited to operators (Principle of Least Privilege and Separation of Duties ).
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To eliminate T4.5 (MITM) and mitigate T4.2 (leaked credentials), TLS encryption
should be enabled. This can be achieved by using either self-signed certificates or a
valid domain certificate. Both methods ensure the encryption of data between client and
server. Domain certificates additionally are able to eliminate MITM (T4.5) attacks, since
certificates can be validated on connection setup.
A detailed guide on how to lock down Jenkins can be found in Securing Jenkins CI
Systems ([82]).
Another topic is the Docker socket which has been mounted into the Jenkins container.
This is required to enable Docker builds in a Docker container, as described in jpetaz-
zo/Using Docker-in-Docker for your CI or testing environment? Think twice. ([101]). If
the Jenkins container has been compromised, this leads to an instant host compromise
(T4.10), since the Docker Engine is able to spawn privileged containers which can mount
the root filesystem writable. To reduce the impact of this compromise, the build server
should be isolated in the network and no other application should be run in the same
Docker swarm or on the host machine (Principle of Least Privilege).
The remaining threat T4.7 (too many parallel builds) can be mitigated by limiting the
number of concurrent builds in the pipeline. Also resource limits for each Jenkins slave
container can be set to avoid memory exhaustion.
Residual Risk
Threats T4.4 and T4.5 could be eliminated. The residual risk for the build server remains
high, since the threats T4.1, T4.2, T4.3, T4.6, T4.8 and T4.9 have a high or medium
risk value and could not be eliminated completely. Those risks make the build server a
highly valuable target for an attacker. The overall risk should be reduced by completely
locking away the build server into a separated network with nothing else running and
strict access controls. Additional security reviews for the build server software should be
created to reduce the number of vulnerabilities. This reduces the likelihood of an incident
happening. If a SSC based on Docker is used, which requires the Docker socket to be
mounted into the Jenkins container, T4.10 rated as high exposes a high residual risk due
to the fact, that it has to be accepted.
6.2.5 Registry (C5)
The testing and production registries hold Docker images which are needed by the Docker
Swarms. Table 6.5 provides overview of identified threats mapped to likelihood, impact,
risk and a mitigation strategy.
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Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T5.1 (broken
auth)
medium high medium mitigate
T5.2 (unau-
thenticated
push)
low high medium eliminate
T5.3 (image
forgery)
low high medium eliminate
T5.4 (vulnera-
bility)
high high high mitigate
T5.5 (MITM) medium medium medium eliminate
T5.6 (too many
interactions)
low medium low mitigate
T5.7 (missing
disk space)
medium medium medium mitigate
Table 6.5: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C5)
Explanations
T5.1: The likelihood of a broken authentication mechanism is medium, since vulnerabil-
ities could be responsible for this to happen. The impact is high, since an attacker could
get access to all images.
T5.2: An unauthenticated push is unlikely to happen, since authentication and autho-
rization should be enabled. The impact is high, since an attacker could push a tampered
image including a backdoor to gain access to production data.
T5.3: Image forgery while pushing an image into the registry is unlikely to occur, since
an attacker would need access to the internal network. The impact is high, because the
attacker would be able to push backdoored images.
T5.4: Vulnerabilities should be expected to occur and have a high impact, since they
could be used to gain access to all Docker images in the registry.
T5.5: MITM attacks are likely to happen if an attacker has access to the internal
network. They have medium impact since an attacker could gain access to unencrypted
sensitive information.
T5.6: Too many interactions are unlikely since access is limited to the build server and
operators. Deployments could be postponed, which makes this a medium impact.
T5.7: Exhausted disk space is likely to occur, especially if the infrastructure is new and
no experiences have been gained yet. The impact is medium, since deployments could be
postponed.
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Mitigation Strategies
To make sure images cannot be pushed by untrusted entities (T5.2), authentication
and authorization have to be used. Docker Registry supports native basic authentication
([47]) (which requires TLS to be configured) and delegating authentication to a trusted
token server ([72]). To enable more advanced authentication and authorization, a proxy
is recommended in front of the registry ([47]) (Principle of Defense in Depth). Access
should be limited to the responsible entities like the build server and operators (Principle
of Least Privilege).
To mitigate the threat of vulnerabilities (T5.4) and a broken authentication mechanism
(T5.1), regular security patches to the registry should be applied.
The threat of a MITM attack (T5.5) can be eliminated by encrypting traffic using TLS
in combination with certificate pinning. Additionally the insecure-registries key in
the daemon.json which allows unencrypted traffic should be avoided (Establish Secure
Defaults). To further reduce the threat of image forgery (T5.3), DCT should be used and
enabled by default (Establish Secure Defaults). To use DCT, an additional Notary server
is required. It is responsible for handling image tag signatures. Before pushing an image
into the testing registry, the build server has to sign the image tag. The testing swarm is
then able to check the signature of the build server (by setting DOCKER CONTENT TRUST=1)
before running the application. On deployment to production, the operator has to sign the
image from the testing registry and push it into the production registry. The production
swarm is then able to make sure the image has been signed by the build server and
additionally by an operator.
The threat of a DoS attack by too many interactions at the same time (T5.6) or disk
space exhaustion (T5.7) can be mitigated by defining resource limits or by replicating the
registry across multiple nodes which have enough resources available. To further increase
the overall security, regular backups need to be created.
To reduce the overall risk of a vulnerability in a Docker image, additional image security
scannings can be integrated into the registry. Docker Registry by default does not offer
an integrated security scanner, but commercial products are available, like for example
Xray from JFrog ([89]) which integrates into Artifactory ([88]).
Residual Risk
Threats T5.2, T5.3 and T5.5 could be eliminated by using mechanisms discussed in this
section. T5.4, T5.1 and T5.7 could be mitigated but expose a residual risk which has to
be addressed by using a patch management process and defining resource quotas. T5.6
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has a low residual risk and can be accepted.
6.2.6 Docker Swarm (C6)
Docker Swarms are used to run and scale the application across multiple nodes. To create
a secure baseline, the underlying OS should be hardened. The detailed hardening process
is out of scope of this work, since hardening guides for different operating systems already
exist, like for instance the CIS Ubuntu Linux 16.04 LTS Benchmark ([23]). Table 6.6 pro-
vides an overview of identified threats mapped to likelihood, impact, risk and a mitigation
strategy.
Threat Likelihood Impact Risk Mitigation
T6.1 (exposed
docker socket)
low high medium eliminate
T6.2 (MITM) high high high eliminate
T6.3 (leaked
credentials)
medium high high mitigate
T6.4 (resource
exhaustion)
medium high high mitigate
T6.5 (container
to host break-
out)
medium high high mitigate
Table 6.6: Risk Calculation and Mitigation (C6)
Explanations
T6.1: The likelihood of an exposed Docker socket is low, since the socket is not exposed by
default. The impact is high, because the attacker could gain an instant host compromise.
T6.2: A MITM attack is expected to occur, if the Docker swarm is extended over
multiple datacenters. The impact is also high, since sensitive information could be leaked
if an attacker sniffs the network.
T6.3: Leaked credentials are likely to occur, especially if error messages or stack traces
are misconfigured. The impact is high, since sensitive data could be accessed by using
the leaked credentials.
T6.4: Resource exhaustion is likely to occur, especially if an attacker uses a DDoS
attack. The impact is high, as the application could become unavailable to other users.
T6.5: A container to host breakout is likely to occur, since an attacker could use a
vulnerability in the application in combination with a kernel exploit to gain access to the
host system. The impact is high, since the attacker would gain access to production data.
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Mitigation Strategies
Access to Docker Swarm management should be given using an encrypted authenti-
cation method, like for example SSH. This eliminates the threat of an exposed Docker
socket (T6.1), since using SSH makes exposing the socket to the network obsolete and
it can be bound to localhost (Establish Secure Defaults). Access to managing the swarm
should be reduced to either the build server (to deploy on testing swarm), or an operator
(to manage the testing and production swarms) (Principle of Least Privilege).
To eliminate MITM attacks (T6.2) between master and worker nodes, Docker Swarm
automatically creates a public key infrastructure (PKI). This encrypts control traffic be-
tween managers and workers by default (Establish Secure Defaults) ([52]). To encrypt
data which is sent from container to container (data plane), overlay encryption should be
enabled by adding the --opt encrypted flag when creating an overlay network. This is
especially relevant, if container clusters are extended over multiple datacenters (which is
not recommended due to the increasing network delay).
To mitigate T6.3 (leaked credentials), credentials need to be stored safely. Docker
Secrets can be used to store and encrypt credentials in the raft log and mount them
into containers on demand. To make sure no unauthorized entity can read them, access
should be limited to operators (Principle of Least Privilege). Also error messages of the
application have to be adjusted to not leak information (Fail Securely).
Resource exhaustion is a problem in container clusters. Per default, no resource limits
for containers are set. This means that a single container is able to block the whole swarm
by using all memory or CPU resources (T6.4). This threat can be mitigated by setting
resource constraints when starting a container. This is not possible on Docker swarm level,
so every application has to define their own runtime limits [64]. This should be enforced
and validated in the CI pipeline by running checks on the docker-compose.prod.yml
file. This could also be enforced by setting parameters for the dockerd process while
configuring the infrastructure [54]. One solution would be to create a cgroup with a
defined memory limit. This cgroup is assigned as parent to all containers on the host by
using the parameter --cgroup-parent.
One concern of using Docker compared to traditional virtualization is the isolation
capability of Docker containers. Container management solutions use a set of kernel
features to isolate process groups from each other. Containers share the same kernel, which
means that using a kernel exploit (T6.5, container to host breakout) in a compromised
container could lead to a compromise of all other containers on the same host. This threat
can be mitigated by using patches from Grsecurity [98] to harden the Linux kernel against
exploits. Using grsecurity patches on the other side is hard to maintain, since the kernel
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has to be compiled by hand.
Additionally, seccomp-bpf filtering can be used to limit the amount of system calls
which can be issued by a process (Minimize Attack Surface Area). The default Docker
seccomp profile disables around 44 system calls [70]. The attack surface can be reduced
further by removing allowed system calls one by one and testing, if the application still
works.
To further reduce the permissions of a Linux container, all Linux capabilities should
be removed (Principle of Least Privilege). Typical web applications do not require Linux
capabilities to run, since they are dynamically parsed and executed. To find out which
capabilities an application requires, utility scripts as described in Find what capabilities
an application requires to successful run in a container [15] are available.
To add an additional layer of security, kernel extensions such as SELinux or AppArmor
can be used.
Containers which run using the --privileged flag should be avoided at any time, since
if such a container is compromised, the host is instantly compromised as well (Principle
of Least Privilege).
Residual Risk
Threat T6.1 and T6.2 could be eliminated by using correct Docker Engine configurations
and encryption. T6.3-T6.5 expose a high risk which can be mitigated using mechanisms
described above. The overall residual risk is still high, especially in production environ-
ments, due to the sensitiveness of data used. This is the reason why especially production
environments should add additional security layers, as for instance a physical separation
to other environments.
6.3 Deployment Process
The deployment should be divided into two separate processes: deployment to testing
and deployment to production environment (Separation of Duties).
Deployment to a testing environment is less critical than to production. The reason is
that the data used in the testing environment database is no real data. Also the end users
are not affected if a testing environment has been compromised. This is why this step
can be done in an automated process, like for example by using a build server. To access
the testing environment, the build server has to store SSH credentials, which means that
if the build server is compromised, the attacker also has access to testing.
Deployments to production environment should be a separate process. If the build
server would be responsible for deploying to production and save the access credentials,
a compromise of the build server would also mean getting access to real client data.
76
6.4 Security Scanning
Additionally, it would create a single point of failure. This is the reason why an operator
should be responsible for deploying the application to production. The operator can
use the management network to log into the testing environment, pull the latest tested
Docker image, sign it using DCT and push it into the production registry. By using this
workflow, the operator can also make sure that each image is tested before pushing it
into the production registry. After pushing the image, he can log into the production
environment using SSH and is then able to update the production swarm.
6.4 Security Scanning
Automated CI pipelines in combination with Docker allow the integration of additional
security scanning in the process. This helps to reduce the overall risk of manipulated or
insecure source code being deployed into production environment. Two main integration
points were found in this work: the image registries and the automated test and build
steps.
Image registries can be extended by plugins which automatically scan the pushed im-
ages, as for example Docker Security Scanning [111]. They are able to scan images for
installed packages and compare the results with security feeds from vendors. This is one
use case in the so called Deep Container Inspection (DCI) ([91]). It is possible to develop
a workflow in which the registries automatically deny the push if a certain threshold of
vulnerabilities or compliance fails have been found in the image.
Additionally, security checks can be integrated into the automated test and build pro-
cess. These checks can lead from simple source code analysis to individual Docker security
checks. Simple source code analysis could for example include checks for typical program-
ming mistakes or the usage of insecure libraries or functions. Docker specific checks could
be analyzing the docker-compose.yml for insecure parameters, such as a network port
which should not be open. This step could also be used to enforce compliance rules before
deploying an application to testing or production. If a compliance check fails, the build
will fail and inform the developers.
6.5 Patch Management
Patch management in automated container environments which follow the Immutable
Infrastructure paradigm requires only little manual interaction.
To patch a running application container, a rebuild and redeployment can be triggered.
A new build is triggered on the separate build server for the base OS image and on the
build server for the application (in the SSC). This creates a new application image based
on a new base OS image, including the latest security patches. After building is done,
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the resulting image can be tested on the testing environment and afterwards deployed
onto production. After running the deploy command, all old containers are replaced with
newly patched containers.
Docker Swarm allows to add and remove new nodes while keeping the cluster alive. If
the infrastructure orchestration has been automated, a newly patched base OS image can
be created and rolled out into the infrastructure. The infrastructure tools shut down the
nodes one by one, while replacing them with new ones. The swarm manager is responsible
for delivering workload onto the newly added instances while keeping the swarm alive.
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In the first chapters, background knowledge to agile software development, CI pipelines,
container virtualization and the Docker ecosystem was explained. A SSC was defined and
it was explained how it integrates with the other topics. In the next chapter the threat
modeling methodology including basic knowledge about information security was defined.
Afterwards a SSC was built and modeled using this methodology. The main components,
processes and users and how they interact with each other were identified and described
afterwards. Based on this information trust boundaries were defined and a threat model
was created using STRIDE. In the last chapter Securing the Software Supply Chain the
identified threats were used to calculate the risk and mitigation strategies were defined.
Also possible solutions to secure the SSC were discussed for each component and the
residual risk was explained. This chapter also answered the first three research questions
from the beginning of this work. The last research question Can a Software Supply Chain
be completely secure? can be answered as follows: It cannot. The results from Chapter
Securing the Software Supply Chain show, that there is always a residual risk which can
be mitigated, but not completeley be elmiminated.
The requirements from Chapter Requirements could be fulfilled. Requirement #1 (Un-
derstand the Background and the Docker Ecosystem) was achieved by explaining back-
ground knowledge in Chapter Agile Software Development and Docker. Requirement #2
(Build a Software Supply Chain) was carried out by defining what a SSC is and explaining
the most relevant components in Chapter Modeling a Software Supply Chain. Require-
ment #3 (Secure the Software Supply Chain) could be partially fulfilled by creating a
threat model, calculating risks and discussing security mechanisms in Chapter Securing
the Software Supply Chain. STRIDE helped to elaborate threats, but it is not able to find
all threats for a component. It always remains a residual risk which cannot be completely
addressed, since there is no total security. Requirements #4 (Use Docker as base Tech-
nology) and #5 (Use Open Source / Free software) were implicitly fulfilled by building
the SSC based on those requirements.
As summary it can be said that a SSC is a collection of processes and components in an
organization which handles sensitive data and needs to be protected regarding the CIA
objectives. The Docker ecosystem provides a good basis since most components, as for
example the VCS or build server can be containerized and run using the same technology.
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Especially when it comes to running an application in a testing or production container
cluster, Docker Swarm takes over a lot of work by orchestrating containers over multiple
nodes. In terms of security Docker provides a good baseline by adding an additional
level of isolation between applications running on the same host. Nevertheless, additional
hardening in form of resource limits (cgroups), seccomp profiles, MAC policies or overlay
network encryption should be applied.
By using a structurized threat modeling process in combination with STRIDE, this work
could identify the main threats for the most relevant components of a SSC and calculate
risks based on the likelihood and impact. Based on these risks security mechanisms
could be discussed and critical components identified. After threat modeling the SSC
this work found out, that each component has the residual risk of vulnerabilities in the
software. This makes a patch management process essential. Due to the immutable
infrastructure paradigm, the containerized components using Docker can be updated by
rebuilding and redeploying the images. This work also found out, that the build server
and the production environments are critical components due to a high residual risk.
The build server handles sensitive source code and should be isolated using networks
with firewalls. The production swarm contains real user data and should be physically
separated from the other components to avoid lateral movement.
This work can be used as basis to build and secure a SSC. However, remaining compo-
nents and processes, such as license and dependency management, logging and monitoring
processes or business integration (for example threat intelligence [6]) have to be reviewed,
evaluated and integrated.
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.1 Application
.1 Application
Listing 1: application/code/index.html
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html >
<body >
<h1>Hello World </h1 >
</body >
</html >
Listing 2: application/docker/development/application/Dockerfile
FROM nginx :1.13
RUN rm /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY docker/development/application/html.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/html.
conf
WORKDIR /var/www/app/
Listing 3: application/docker/development/application/html.conf
server {
listen 80 default_server;
server_name _;
index index.html;
root /var/www/app;
}
Listing 4: application/docker/production/application/Dockerfile
FROM nginx :1.13
RUN rm /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
COPY docker/production/application/html.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/html.conf
COPY code/ /var/www/app
RUN chown -R nginx:nginx /var/www/app
WORKDIR /var/www/app
Listing 5: application/docker/production/application/html.conf
server {
97
listen 80 default_server;
server_name _;
index index.html;
root /var/www/app;
}
Listing 6: application/build.sh
#!/ usr/bin/env bash
# Include exports
. ./ exports
docker -compose -f docker -compose.yml -f docker -compose.prod.yml build
Listing 7: application/deploy.sh
#!/ usr/bin/env bash
# Include exports
. ./ exports
scp docker -compose.prod.yml ubuntu@swarmhost :/home/ubuntu/
ssh ubuntu@swarmhost ’docker stack deploy --compose -file /home/ubuntu/
docker -compose.prod.yml application ’
Listing 8: application/docker-compose.prod.yml
version: ’3’
services:
application:
build:
dockerfile: docker/production/application/Dockerfile
context: .
image: ${REPOSITORY}agilesec${VERSION}
ports:
- 80:80
Listing 9: application/docker-compose.yml
version: ’3’
services:
application:
build:
dockerfile: docker/development/application/Dockerfile
context: .
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.2 Build Server
image: agilesec
ports:
- 80:80
volumes:
- ./code:/var/www/app
Listing 10: application/exports
export REPOSITORY ="127.0.0.1:5000/"
#export REPOSITORY =""
export VERSION =":0.2"
export STACKNAME =" application"
Listing 11: application/push.sh
#!/ usr/bin/env bash
# Include exports
. ./ exports
docker -compose -f docker -compose.yml -f docker -compose.prod.yml push
.2 Build Server
Listing 12: buildserver/docker-compose.yml
version: ’3’
services:
jenkins:
image: slipke/jenkins:latest
ports:
- "8081:8080"
- "50000:50000"
volumes:
- jenkins_home :/var/jenkins_home
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
volumes:
jenkins_home:
.3 VCS Server
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Listing 13: vcs/docker-compose.yml
version: ’3’
services:
gitolite:
image: jgiannuzzi/gitolite:latest
ports:
- "2222:22"
volumes:
- gitolite -sshkeys :/etc/ssh/keys
- gitolite -git:/var/lib/git
environment:
SSH_KEY: "<ssh_key >"
volumes:
gitolite -sshkeys:
gitolite -git:
.4 Registry
Listing 14: registry/docker-compose.yml
version: ’3’
services:
registry:
image: registry :2
ports:
- "5000:5000"
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